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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Abby Grewatz 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Folklore Program 
 
December 2013 
 
Title: Folk Art, Nationalism, and Identity in a Kyiv, Ukraine Souvenir Market 
 
 
Since the collapse of the USSR independent Ukraine has used politics and culture 
to define a separate national identity, in contrast to Russia. Through a performance 
studies lens I describe Kyiv’s largest souvenir market, Andriyivsky Uzviz, and place it in 
the context of nationalism and cultural promotion. I draw on Conquergood who situates 
the performing of culture at the intersection of history and identity, and Kapchan who 
notes that markets are key sites where ethnic identity is defined within sociopolitical 
frameworks. While profit and customer demand are important to vendors in the Uzviz, 
Ukrainianness is consciously emphasized through their folk art items. Vendors wear 
national costume, sell “traditional” Ukrainian items, and explicitly identify as Ukrainian, 
not Russian. Through one Uzviz folk artist I illustrate vendors’ use of folk arts to express 
Ukrainian cultural identity and show how the market is a microcosm of the larger 
nationalist movement in Ukraine.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
Souvenir markets are often an integral part of a tourist’s experience in Ukraine. 
Many people purchase items that become gifts, memories, and parts of personal history. 
Markets are complex, dynamic places that allow interaction among tourists, local 
residents, and material culture. In the following thesis I focus on a souvenir market in 
Kyiv, Ukraine, known in Ukrainian as Andriyivsky Uzviz.  
To contextualize the market, in Chapter II I outline a general history of folk art in 
the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This chapter focuses on the folk art revival on 
the late 19th century, and then on general government policies and regulation of folk art 
production and sale. I explore how the government in the past has officially used folk 
arts, both as a mode of cultural preservation and later as propaganda. Revivals set the 
stage for the entrance of folk arts into international markets, as well as contributing to 
ideas of national identity in the Russian Empire. This changed drastically in the early 
Soviet period, when the regime initially tried to eradicate folklore. However, leaders 
changed their minds and instead placed strict control over folk art production. After the 
death of Stalin, folk art producers enjoyed looser policies and eventually folk art found its 
way to souvenir markets, such as Andriyivsky Uzviz, that were founded in the 1980s. 
In Chapter III I contextualize the market further by discussing the history of 
Ukraine, emphasizing its relations with Russia. The two countries have intertwined 
histories, tracing back centuries to their shared ancestry of the Kievan Rus’. Ukraine was 
later part of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. Although Ukraine attempted 
	  	  2 
many times to gain more independence under the Russian and Soviet ruling powers, it 
was not able to do so until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Along the way many 
Ukrainians adopted ideas of romantic nationalism, and these ideas have continued to 
inform Ukrainian politics today. The nationalist movement in contemporary Ukraine is 
complex and multi-faceted. It is complicated by the ethnic makeup1 of the country and by 
the population’s use of both Ukrainian and Russian languages. Many Ukrainians would 
like to see increased separation from Russia, but the fact remains that Ukraine is highly 
dependent on Russia for gas and trade. In this chapter I discuss political developments 
such as the Orange Revolution of 2004, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko, and the language bill of 2012 that show that many Ukrainians support more 
Ukrainian independence. However, other more recent developments, such as President 
Yanukovych’s scrapping of signing agreements with the European Union, have shown 
that this may be quite difficult. Large scale protests against Yanukovych in December 
2013 show the fragility of the situation.  
In Chapter IV I discuss one small area where I see strong promotion of Ukrainian 
national identity. I describe the market in detail, profile an artist and his life history, and 
explore how the market expresses the rising nationalism that is currently permeating the 
country’s politics, particularly in cities like Kyiv. As in any market setting, profit and 
customer demand are important to vendors in the Uzviz. Alongside this, artists and 
vendors also consciously emphasize Ukrainianness through their folk art items. Vendors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ukraine’s most recent census in 2001 indicates that ethnic Ukrainians made up 77.8% of the population, 
and ethnic Russians were about 17%. Ukraine’s minority ethnic groups made up around 5-6% of the total 
population. They included Belorussians (0.6%), Moldavians (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Bulgarians 
(0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Poles (0.3%), Jews (0.2%), Armenians (0.2%), and Roma (0.1%), among 
others. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 2001" 2003-2004) This thesis focuses on the majority ethnic 
Ukrainian and Russian populations’ relations. 
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wear national costume, sell “traditional” Ukrainian items, and explicitly identify as 
Ukrainian, not Russian. Through one Uzviz folk artist I illustrate vendors’ use of folk arts 
to express Ukrainian cultural identity. I show how the market is a microcosm of the larger 
nationalist movement in Ukraine, but emphasize that it is not in the same category as 
street protesters or radical politicians who communicate their nationalist views more 
overtly. The market is a safer, more innocuous setting to express ethnic and national 
pride, and this pride is in fact expected and supported by market visitors who come to the 
market hoping to purchase Ukrainian souvenirs.  
I draw on Conquergood (1992 and 2006) who situates the performing of culture at 
the intersection of history and identity, and Kapchan (1996) who notes that markets are 
key sites where ethnic identity is defined within sociopolitical frameworks. Uzviz artists 
and vendors are not explicitly political, but they incorporate their political leanings into 
their market practices by choosing to only sell Ukrainian folk arts. I build on this and 
suggest that cultural promotion in the Uzviz is a small part of a greater movement of 
Ukrainian nationalism that is happening currently in the country. Politics in Ukraine since 
1991 has been informed by cultural and national contestation with Russia. It is my goal in 
this thesis to discover if and how this contestation informs market activities. In several 
specific behaviors, some of which include selling only Ukrainian folk arts, choosing to 
speak only Ukrainian, and wearing Ukrainian folk costume, artists and vendors present 
themselves as Ukrainian, though their motives for doing such things may vary. For 
example, some say outright that they are pro-Ukrainian and do not want to sell Russian 
souvenirs or speak Russian in the market. Others use their Ukrainian identities to sell 
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more wares, such as one woman who says her sales increased substantially after she 
began wearing Ukrainian folk costume in the market. 
In Andriyivsky Uzviz wares may be contemporary souvenir items like 
commemorative t-shirts or coffee mugs, or folk art forms like carved wooden spoons or 
embroidered scarves. Folk art forms have roots in history and traditions dating back 
hundreds of years. In my discussion of the market in the present I show that vendors 
unofficially use their folk art wares to assert national identity. In this way the Uzviz is 
also an avenue of cultural promotion and transmission, due to the current nationalistic 
political backdrop. Visitors2 see the market as a nice place to purchase souvenirs, which it 
is, but that is usually the extent of their knowledge about the market. Some are unfamiliar 
with the differences between Russian culture and Ukrainian culture, because of these 
countries’ shared histories, so they expect to see Russian souvenirs. Artists and vendors 
know this and by selling only Ukrainian wares hope to change this misconception.  
Methods 
In my research, I was primarily interested in three large questions. First, what 
kinds of souvenir folk arts can be found in the Uzviz and how do vendors choose what to 
sell? Second, given the history of folk arts in the Soviet Union (and earlier) how and why 
have they entered the souvenir context? Third, how can they be interpreted specifically in 
the larger political context of independent Ukraine? To answer these questions I engaged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ukraine’s State Statistics Service reports on tourism in Ukraine. The most recent information available 
indicates that around 23 million foreign citizens visited Ukraine and around 2 million domestic tourists 
traveled within Ukraine in 2012. ("Turistichni Potoky" May 2013) A 2007 report of the Ukraine Ministry 
of Economic Development and Trade states that visitors to Ukraine came from the following regions: 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states 57% (mostly Russia, Poland, Moldova, and Belarus), 
European Union (EU) states 36% (mostly Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany), other 7% ("Tourism Trends 
in Ukraine 2007" 2007). It appears that this government agency does not publish this information yearly. 
Hypothetically, if we assume that at least 30% of tourists visit Kyiv, and then assume that they probably 
visit Andriyivsky Uzviz, we can estimate that about 7.5 million people may pass through the Uzviz yearly. 
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in several types of ethnographic research. I spent six weeks in Kyiv, Ukraine doing 
fieldwork as part of an intensive Russian language program. While in Kyiv, I did research 
at Andriyivsky Uzviz primarily engaging in general and participant observation. I closely 
observed and recorded how many souvenir stands and stalls there were on a given day, 
who was selling souvenirs, how they were dressed, what kinds of souvenirs they were 
selling, and who was buying, among other things. I also participated as a tourist at the 
market. I conducted impromptu interviews with vendors, asking general questions about 
their jobs as souvenir vendors or artists, what they sold and why, and purchased a few 
souvenirs myself. I gained a great deal of information from short conversations with 
vendors and tourists, and from overhearing conversations of market-goers. I took many 
photos during my times at the market, which allowed me to recreate descriptive images 
of the market; these accompany my analysis. Unless otherwise stated, all photos in the 
following chapters are mine. I was fortunate to conduct more in-depth interviews with 
one artist and from these I gained detailed information about his life history, career as an 
artist, and about inner workings of the market.  
I used print and online resources to gather background historical information and 
current information on the political situation in Ukraine. These included historical 
sources on Soviet folk arts and government folklore policies, as well as contemporary 
analyses of these phenomena. I also consulted online newspapers and journals in English 
and Russian, from which I gathered information about Ukraine’s current political climate. 
I also took a small amount of information about Andriyivsky Uzviz from online sources 
such as Russian travel websites and video sites like YouTube.  
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My knowledge of the Russian language became an integral part of conducting this 
research. This could cause complications at times, due to my less-than-native fluency. 
Furthermore, Kyiv presented another yet another challenge because Ukraine is a bilingual 
country. Most Ukrainians speak both languages, though they may speak one better than 
the other. Eastern Ukraine is primarily Russian-speaking and western Ukraine is 
primarily Ukrainian-speaking. Kyiv is located in east-central Ukraine, and Russian is the 
main language of many of its inhabitants. Russian has been used in Ukraine for hundreds 
of years, especially when it was part of the Soviet Union, and many consider it to be the 
official language of public life. That is, Russian is used in the workplace, in schools, and 
on the street. However, Ukrainian is also widely used. In fact, although many people 
speak Russian in public, most street signs, billboards, and business names are in 
Ukrainian. Thus the bilingual quality of life in Ukraine is somewhat balanced, but is also 
a source of political debate and sometimes conflict. In Chapter III I address a few small 
aspects of this conflict. Many Ukrainians would like to see a transition to using more 
Ukrainian in public life. Some even support a complete eradication of the Russian 
language in Ukraine.  
While in Kyiv I began to understand the implications of this with regards to 
conducting my research. I noticed the use of both languages in different contexts. Many 
Kyivans speak Russian at work or school, and Ukrainian with friends and at home. In 
shops I often participated in conversations in which I spoke Russian and the shop owner 
spoke Ukrainian. Bilingual conversations and code switching within conversations is 
common. It was important to me to be ethical and considerate of the people and place I 
was studying, and part of this was speaking the language to better understand my topic in 
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context. However, I spoke no Ukrainian, so this became impossible. Although this may 
have placed certain limitations on my research I feel that I have successfully navigated 
any possible shortcomings. Russian is the de facto language of many parts of Ukraine, 
including Kyiv, and speaking Russian there did not seem to limit my gathering of 
information in any measurable way. Also, most official documents, including those I 
have analyzed in my research, from Ukraine from the Soviet period were written in 
Russian because it was the official language of the Soviet Union. While I feel that 
speaking Ukrainian would have enriched my research experience in Kyiv, it was not 
completely necessary, and I do not recognize any deficiencies in the results of my 
research directly caused by not speaking Ukrainian.  
Note on Transliterations 
For ease of reading, I have chosen to transliterate all Russian or Ukrainian words 
that appear in this thesis. Well-known Russian names of places or people, such as 
Moscow and Gorky, have been left in their Anglicized equivalencies. Other 
transliterations are mine and generally follow the U.S. Library of Congress system. 
Historically, Ukrainian names have often been transliterated from their Russian 
translations, rather than directly from the Ukrainian (e.g. Kiev, instead of Kyiv). I have 
chosen to transliterate directly from Ukrainian. Some Ukrainian church names have been 
Romanized for ease of understanding and reading (e.g. St. Andrew’s Church, instead of 
Andriyivska Tserkva).  
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CHAPTER II 
FOLK ART HISTORY AND POLICY IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA  
AND THE SOVIET UNION 
 
Before describing and analyzing Andriyivsky Uzviz, it is necessary to understand 
the background of folk art and folklore policy in the former Russian Empire and the 
former Soviet Union. Of particular note will be that, in contrast to much of history, in 
Ukraine today the government does not influence folklore quite as much as it did in the 
past. In the following chapter I trace the history of the study of and policies about 
folklore and folk art, from Imperial Russia, through the Emancipation of the serfs in 
1861, and during and after the communist revolution of 1917. Much of this chapter 
centers on the general Soviet policy on folklore. In Chapter III I expand on the specific 
history of Ukraine. 
Beginnings of Folk Art Study in Imperial Russia 
Scholars and upper classes in Imperial Russia divided art and culture into “high” 
and “low” culture. High generally consisted of classical music, opera, ballet, sculpture, 
and other arts which were part of and supported by the state-owned Academy of the Arts. 
Low was defined as peasant or folk culture, and included forms such as folk music, wood 
carving arts, and folktales. High art was considered of the elite, wealthy, upper classes, 
and low art was a completely separate realm of the poorer classes of society (Stites 2005, 
2).  High and low did not mix and those in the elite class did not consider themselves to 
have much connection to folk culture. However, in the mid-nineteenth century elite 
thought with regard to folk culture began to change. Some elites began to see folk culture 
as a representation of “real Russianness” and connected it to Russian national identity 
	  	  9 
and heritage. This connection was officially made and endorsed by the imperial 
government in the late 1800s. At that time the study of folklore itself was relatively new 
in Russia; very few had begun to collect Russian folklore in earnest until the late 
eighteenth century (Perrie 1989, 121), and this mostly included oral tradition such as 
folktales and folksongs. (Hellberg-Hirn 1998, 137) Many of these collections began as 
ethnographic studies, at the time an emerging discipline. 
Ethnography as a discipline in the Russian Empire began in the late 18th century 
and early 19th century when Russian scholars began collecting folk songs and stories, 
mostly for entertainment value. There were a few folklore collections that emerged in the 
1820s as intellectuals became interested in defining the Russian national spirit. In 1845 
the Ethnography Division of the Russian Geographical Society was founded and set up 
ethnography as a distinct academic discipline in Russia. The Empire was quite 
widespread geographically by this time and part of the interest in ethnography came from 
an interest in the various ethnic and cultural groups that were encompassed by the 
Empire, knowledge of whom would be useful for two reasons. First, understanding the 
ways these groups lived would allow for easier governance of them because local policies 
could be improved based on the needs of the people. Second, ethnographers considered 
themselves enlightened and felt the need to raise awareness of Russian national history 
and culture. Developing heritage would require reforms to emancipate the peasants, who 
were seen as the roots of national consciousness in Russia. (Knight 1998, 132-133)  
Emancipation occurred in 1861 but in the 20-25 years immediately following, 
former serfs still had not really been integrated into the greater society; most of the upper 
class looked down upon the former peasant class. However, there was a certain 
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contingent of the high class, those who had been introduced to the ethnographic studies 
of the past several decades, who gained sympathy for the poor after the emancipation. 
They discovered, just as the ethnographers had, a romanticized, spiritual, and 
aesthetically pleasing aspect to the poor, and especially to their arts and crafts3, and 
appropriated this for their own artistic uses. Artists began to paint idyllic scenes of 
country life, architects began to emulate the style of the izba, a traditional log hut lived in 
by many peasants, and even the Imperial Porcelain Factory borrowed designs from 
peasant embroidery to paint on tea sets. (Salmond 1997, 6)  
The rich began to collect folklore directly from the peasantry, filling their private 
collections and museums, engaging in a sort of armchair study of folklore. The upper 
class began to spread the idea that peasants were the ideal Russians, the repositories of all 
cultural knowledge and tradition. Wealthy collectors seemed to be, maybe paradoxically, 
both selective and vague in terms of what they collected.  On the one hand, only certain 
folklore was deemed worthy of collection and documentation, so any material judged to 
be "impure" in some way was left out, a process that seems quite specific and detailed. 
On the other hand, that which was chosen to represent Russian national identity was 
idealized, generalized, and oversimplified. (Hellberg-Hirn 1998, 138) In fact, some 
scholars argue that although nationalism was becoming an important issue in intellectual 
circles, actually there was a weak sense of a mass national or ethnic identity in Russia at 
this time. The reasons are variable: first, the empire occupied a huge amount of territory 
and tsarist policies did not include mass education and spread of information to the 
people; second, only the educated upper classes knew anything about Russian historical 
events and personalities; third, because the empire encompassed so many different ethnic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Appendix for a list of folk arts and crafts.  
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groups, and ethnic Russians at the time tended to define themselves only in opposition to 
other groups (e.g. Jews, Armenians), it would have been difficult and probably 
impossible to unite the entire population under the banner of one identity and nationality. 
(Brandenberger 2002, 10-17) Ukrainians in particular were a special case to the imperial 
government. Ukrainians constituted the largest non-Russian ethnic group in the empire, 
and Ukraine’s land was considered economically and strategically crucial to the 
continuing success of the empire. Both Russians and Ukrainians claimed a common 
ancestry, and Ukraine’s language, culture, and people were very similar to Russians’. 
Because of their shared history, most Russians believed that Ukrainians were similar 
enough to Russians to be absorbed into the greater Russian population4. In fact, starting 
in the late 18th century, this had already begun to happen in the upper classes. Ukrainians 
often used intermarriage with Russians to gain a higher socioeconomic status. However, 
Russians generally did not support any notions of equality for Ukrainians, but rather, 
thought that absorbing them would be a way more strongly to control them. In short, the 
average Ukrainian was not socially or economically equal to the average Russian, and 
thus occupied a position of opposition to Russian ethnic identity. (Kappeler 2001, 61-67) 
The results of ethnic Russians’ views of the various minority ethnic groups were 
collections of tales, songs, and art that were chosen only from ethnic Russians to 
represent everyone, but without recognizing that these neither represented all Russians, 
nor all citizens of the empire.  
During post emancipation, the rich collectors soon realized that what they had 
was a finite resource, and that something needed to be done to replenish it. They focused 
primarily on folk arts for three reasons. First, their personal collections consisted mostly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Ukraine was even known as “Little Russia” during the imperial era.	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of material culture: embroidered clothing, pieces of wood carving taken directly from the 
sides of peasant huts, wood carved bowls and spoons. Material culture is what they were 
interested in because it could be collected and displayed in their homes. Second, due to 
emancipation and the empire’s rapid modernization and industrialization, many peasants 
moved to cities where they could find higher paying jobs in industry. This meant leaving 
behind their traditional folk arts and crafts, the production of which carried no financial 
profit to them. (Salmond 1996, 6) Peasants were less likely to stop telling folktales or 
singing folk songs because these were oral traditions they could take with them to cities; 
though, admittedly these folklore practices would change under the influence of urban 
life. Third, producing traditional folk arts was becoming more impossible, since industry 
generally had a monopoly on raw materials. The peasants often were the growers and 
producers of materials like wood, flax, and clay but it was most profitable for them to sell 
their yearly production to industries such as the railroad, and textile and ceramics 
factories. This did not leave much raw material for folk arts and crafts. (Salmond 1987, 
128) The problem of vanishing folk arts and crafts was solved in a simple, yet effective 
way.  
Folk Art Revival 
Beginning in the 1870s, a few well-known gentry women of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg undertook the task of reviving Russian women’s folk arts and crafts. They 
believed women’s arts were important because of women’s typical roles in the home: 
they raised children and passed on the folk culture that rich collectors were so worried 
about losing. These gentry women were patrons of the arts, collectors, historians, and 
artists. Although they are known today as the first revivalists of women’s folk arts and 
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crafts, what they did was under the auspices of their landowning husbands and of male 
artists of the time. Artists such as Sergey Malyutin, Ilya Repin, Mikhail Vrubel, and 
others were the public faces of the revival efforts. In fact, most folkloric collecting up to 
this time was male-centered, that is, male collectors who collected folklore from men and 
generally ignored female and children's folk tradition (Hellberg-Hirn 1998, 138), so this 
revival was an interesting deviation from the norm.  
The women established folk art workshops on their husbands’ estates and offered 
peasants a deal: if they would quit their industry jobs to do their traditional arts and 
crafts, and if they would be open to “guidance” by their benefactresses, they would be 
rewarded with a secure income and guaranteed markets to sell their goods. The 
workshops accomplished two important things. First, they guaranteed that the dying folk 
culture would be renewed and strengthened. Second, the folk art would be reincorporated 
into the greater Russian culture as a new profitable industry, specifically targeted at 
foreign markets. The focus on foreign markets was a direct result of wealthy Russians’ 
interest in preserving Russian folk culture. Their goal was to elevate the empire’s status 
in the world by showing how rich and unique their folk culture was. To do this, they 
needed material culture, i.e. folk arts, to sell to foreign visitors in shops in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, and to export to important European exhibitions in cities like Paris for 
foreigners to see and purchase. There were no souvenir markets at this time, so shops and 
exhibitions were the only locations where people could purchase Russian folk arts. 
However, the folk art workshops always allowed visitors, especially the owners’ wealthy 
friends, to observe artists creating folk arts. (Salmond 1997, 8) 
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The most famous workshop was called Abramstevo, located near Moscow on the 
estate of railway magnate Savva Mamontov. His wife Elizaveta established the workshop 
as a community of artists who were looking for a “authentic, subjective experience of 
Russian history, landscape, and culture.” (Salmond 1997, 8) She enlisted the help of 
artists such as Malyutin and Elena Polonova to direct the workshop and teach local 
peasant children. Malyutin in particular considered himself qualified to teach the peasant 
children because he had studied folk painting, architecture, ceramics, and other folk arts 
and. These children were recruited so that they would not grow up to seek work in the 
cities and increase the rate of loss of peasant culture. One of the most famous products 
from Abramstevo was the matryoshka, also known as the nesting doll, shown in Figure 1, 
in its original paint design. This doll, which was created by Malyutin in 1891, would 
become the quintessential symbol of the folk revival, and also a very popular Russian 
souvenir in more recent times.  
Everything about the matryoshka is folkloric. 
She is a peasant woman, stereotypically dressed in a 
peasant skirt, apron, and blouse, with a scarf on her 
head. She holds a rooster. The smaller nested dolls are 
dressed similarly, holding a basket of berries and a 
loaf of bread, with the two smallest representing 
children. The name matryoshka comes from 
“Matryona”, a popular name for Russian peasant 
women of the time. The matryoshka is carved from 
wood, often the ubiquitous Russian birch on a wood-turning lathe. Each must be 
Figure 1. The first matryoshka 
design 
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handmade or the tops and bottoms will not fit together properly. Then they are painted 
and lacquered. Usually men carve and women paint. When the dolls first were made, 
each workshop had its own style and the dolls could be classified as such. At this time 
themes were folkloric in nature, but in recent years painting has diversified, especially 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Matryoshki are often painted in batches of the 
same design, and each one is unique because they are handmade. Since the upper class 
strongly supported folk arts and folk arts education, local and international markets began 
to demand more sale of the dolls. Matryoshka making became an important part of the 
folk art industry, with the town of Sergiev Posad acting as the center for production. (Ertl 
and Hibberd 2003, xi) 
The success of Abramstevo spread and more workshops were opened. Another 
famous workshop patroness was Maria Tenisheva. Tenisheva was a trained opera singer 
who later became a historian, collector, and artist. In 1900, through these interests – and 
with the help of her rich husband’s money – she decided to purchase an estate near the 
city of Smolensk that would be made into a large workshop, called Talashkino, for 
studying and learning to make folk arts. She invited Malyutin, who had since left 
Abramstevo, to head the workshop and together they selected peasant children who they 
deemed most capable from the surrounding villages to take classes at the workshop. 
Under Malyutin’s training, pupils created a large collection of folk arts, which would 
eventually make its way to an exhibition in the Louvre in Paris in 1907, the first 
exhibition of Russian folk art abroad. Tenisheva worked to increase the number of 
students at Talashkino, but not many children seemed interested. She left Malyutin to 
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teaching his classes and took a different approach to increasing the number of artists. 
(Tenisheva 2008, 417) 
She changed her focus to peasant women, who, she said, needed a way to earn a 
living that would allow them to stay at home with their families. These women were 
already talented in certain folk arts such as embroidery and fabric dyeing, so they would 
not have to be trained to participate in Tenisheva’s preservation efforts. They would work 
at Talashkino, earning a salary for making clothing, which would then be sold at a shop 
called Rodnik in Moscow. The catch was that the women would have to agree to make 
designs, patterns, and colors on the clothing as Tenisheva dictated. Tenisheva believed 
that traditional clothing had gone out of style with the upper classes because there were 
no colors or designs that appealed to them. The way to make them fashionable again was 
to change the “indigenous” styles to more modern ones. She proposed her idea to the 
local peasant women, who were reluctant at first, but eventually agreed to be employed at 
Talashkino making embroidery. (Tenisheva 2008, 418) 
Peasant women were employees of the workshop, but could actually work out of 
their homes. They had the raw materials such as cloth, yarn, and canvas, which they 
produced themselves, and Tenisheva paid them for the use of those materials. The 
materials were taken to Talashkino to be dyed in the appropriate colors, and sent back to 
the women, who sewed and embroidered the clothing at home. Tenisheva was very 
satisfied with their output and soon commissioned the women to begin making larger 
items, such as window drapes, tablecloths, and furniture upholstery. The number of 
women working for her increased to two thousand, and at the same time, Malyutin’s part 
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of the workshop began to grow, so that all of Talashkino was full of artists and their 
works. (Tenisheva 2008, 419) 
The workshops also had a third, unofficial, and perhaps unrecognized, goal. That 
is, because the elites were in control of it, folk arts revival was in fact another way for 
them to control the masses. The options for these peasant women were either to work in 
factories, making low wages in dangerous jobs, or to work making their traditional folk 
arts. Of course, making folk art was probably more enjoyable than industry work, and 
they were making a small profit for their arts, but they were not in charge of their own 
means of production or of what they could produce because the elites were the ones with 
the funds to support it. Artists such as Malyutin who taught in the workshops did not 
teach all types of folk arts, nor did they focus on any arts besides ethnic Russian. This 
was a significant time for elite control and use of folk art in the Russian Empire, because 
it would continue in the following century after the revolution.  
Imperial Government Involvement in Folk Art 
By the end of the 1890s, even before Talashkino, the imperial government saw 
how successful these workshops were and decided to start its own, including both men's 
and women's folk arts, but with a bit more control, and over a wider area throughout the 
empire. Local provincial governments were in charge of running the workshops, and 
every craft and item produced was carefully monitored by teams of artists, administrators, 
and marketing specialists. Certain aspects of design and form were considered more 
appropriate for representing Russia to the world and these were favored and encouraged.  
Folk arts of the Russian Empire were displayed on the world stage at the 1900 
Paris Exhibition Universelle, in the over 6000-item Section of Kustar (handicraft) Object 
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and Handicrafts. The exhibition was the site of many demonstrations of national identity 
and culture, and Russia capitalized on this trend, presenting itself as an “exotic other” but 
also as belonging in the modern world. Many elite women involved with the folk art 
revivals of previous decades helped organize the Russian section, as well as some of the 
male artists associated with the workshops. (Notably, no peasant men or women were 
part of the organization or selecting of items.) One of their goals was to represent Russia 
as unique, traditional yet modern, and successful in the art world. The section included 
many types of arts: embroidery, lace, clothing, toys, furniture, and even an architectural 
display of small peasant houses. Elite artists created many of these objects, not the 
peasants whom the art was supposed to represent. However, this did not seem to bother 
any exhibition visitors, and the Russian pavilion was well received and won many 
awards. (Harkness 2009, 266-271)  
After the Revolution of 1905 the government apportioned even more money to 
folk art preservation in attempt to show connection to and support of the people. It 
created a new organization to support peasant arts and crafts industries, called the Chief 
Administration of Agricultural and Land Tenure (GUZZ). The goal of this supporting 
administration was ultimately to increase economic profit and political gain, under the 
guise of supporting the common people. Exhibitions of folk arts and crafts were regularly 
held, and these exhibitions served to further enforce Russian hegemony and to justify 
continued autocratic control. (Warren 2009, 749-750) These exhibitions were usually put 
on in Moscow or St. Petersburg, where they would be accessible to international visitors, 
and where the Russian elites could admire folk arts without having to get too close to the 
actual folk.  
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In 1911 the School of Folk Art was opened in St. Petersburg. This school was 
sponsored by GUZZ and was patronized by the imperial family itself. It brought peasant 
girls from all over the empire to be trained in rigorous courses in all traditional women’s 
arts and handicrafts. Classes were taught by wealthy elites who had learned to make folk 
arts, not peasants who had grown up making the arts. One of the School’s goals was to 
make a standardized set of rules, patterns, and skills, and proper teaching would not be 
possible with individual peasant artists who did not conform to the standards. After 
completing the courses, each girl would return to her home province to teach other 
peasant girls her new folk art skills. In this way the government could continue to spread 
the folk art revival using the least amount of resources. (Salmond 1997, 13) The School’s 
purpose and results can be interpreted in two ways. First, it preserved many traditional 
Russian folk arts and ensured that production would continue. Second, it commercialized 
and standardized folk arts and crafts, taking them out of their original contexts. Students 
were taught to make certain arts in certain ways, and then to pass their skills on to their 
peers. They were participating in a scripted production of folk art, which, on the one 
hand, served to more explicitly define “Russian culture”, but, on the other hand, actively 
excluded and replaced things that were also “Russian”, such as the folk arts of the many 
other ethnic groups of the empire. This meant that even ethnic groups such as Ukrainians 
who were most closely related to Russians were not represented. For example, pysanky 
(sing. pysanka), painted eggs, were one of the most famous types of Ukrainian folk art 
but were not selected to be taught in the School. This selection and favoring of Russian 
folk arts would continue into the Soviet era. 
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Folk arts were displayed again in 1913 at the Second All-Russian Kustar 
Exhibition held in St. Petersburg. By this time the nobility were thoroughly interested in 
folk art, and many, including Tsar Nikolai, attended the exhibition. It included only the 
highest quality, most well made examples of ethnic Russian folk art – embroidery, 
furniture, wood carved items such as toys and decorative bowls – specifically selected for 
the show. It was also part of the celebration of the 300-year anniversary of the Romanov 
dynasty. Because it was so heavily attended and successful, this exhibition was touted as 
a great victory for imperial influence on folk arts. (Warren 2009, 744) But not everyone 
shared this view. 
Avant-garde artist Mikhail Larionov critiqued this exhibition with his own 
exhibition, which premiered just days after the Second All-Russian. His was the 
Exhibition of Icon Patterns and Lubki, on display in Moscow at a small private gallery.  
Lubki (sing. lubok) are icon templates or art prints painted on wood or paper, a very 
popular folk art form in Russia. This exhibition was smaller, more intimate, and consisted 
of more modest items. Larionov questioned how peasant arts and crafts could be used to 
celebrate the empire, when the very peasants who were creating these works had 
struggled so long under the empire’s yoke and were eager to be free from it. Larionov 
also did something that no one else had done: he connected folk arts with the avant-garde. 
His exhibition ran in conjunction with an avant-garde exhibition in a neighboring room of 
the same gallery.  
This exhibition, put on by Larionov’s partner Natalya Goncharova, was a stark 
contrast to Larionov’s in terms of content (hers was a display of abstract, rayonist5 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Rayonism was a style of abstract painting developed by Larionov and Goncharova, inspired by the 
Futurist art movement of the time. It was so named for the style’s characteristic brush strokes, which 
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paintings), but it also served to make a link from the present to the past. In displaying 
folk arts and the avant-garde in such close proximity, these two exhibitions showed that 
the past and the present can coexist, each in its own right, and without influence by one 
on the other. While the physical differences of the two types of art were obvious, 
Larionov elevated folk arts to the same status of the avant-garde and challenged viewers 
to see them as aesthetically equal. He believed that the government did not need to 
change or select for peasant crafts; they were a high art form in the same way that the 
avant-garde was. (Warren 2009, 745-746)  
Ultimately, what the Second All-Russian and Larionov’s exhibitions showed was 
a fundamental difference in how an avant-garde artist and the state viewed traditional 
folk art. Not only did they disagree on what authentic folk art was, but they also 
disagreed on who the folk were and what that meant for nationality. The government 
viewed folk art as static, in the past, in need of preservation, and as a way to express a 
certain selected version of Russian nationality; whereas Larionov viewed it as dynamic, 
very much in the present, as a way to express “true” Russian nationality, and as a tool of 
political opposition. But what they had in common was their inheritance of the last 
century’s principles of folk art revival, which, like revivals in other European countries, 
was “a response to crises of collective identity in the face of dramatic economic change.” 
(Warren 2009, 747) It was a way to connect with a simpler peasant time, before 
industrialization and modernization. It was rooted in exoticism and nostalgia (Hilton 
1994, 82) and in the idea of “the folk,” or narod in Russian.  
Folk Art in the Pre-Stalinist and Stalinist Soviet Union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
resemble rays of light. See John E. Bowlt’s Russian Art of the Avant-garde: Theory and Criticism 1902-
1934.  
	  	  22 
After the Communist Revolution of 1917, official government control of folk art 
took another shape, though not immediately. In the first few years after the revolution, as 
the new ruling party was otherwise occupied setting up government, folklorists were free 
to do their work uninterrupted. This was the so-called Golden Age of Soviet folklore. 
Some of the most important Soviet folklore studies, such as those of Vladimir Propp, 
were completed at this time. However, in the 1920s, the Proletarian Cultural and 
Educational Organization (Proletcul’t) of the new government began to hear of these 
works and their contents, and decided that folklore was potentially dangerous to Soviet 
ideals. Many folktales and songs glorified the tsars, empire, and bourgeois ideas that had 
been Russian culture for almost the last 500 years. Much of Russian folklore also 
included references to Orthodoxy, the official religion of Russia since 988 CE. These 
themes were considered hazardous to children’s education in the new communist regime 
because they promoted ideals that didn’t coincide with the new communist ideology. The 
Proletcul’t sought to eradicate folklore, despite the protests of folklorists like Azadovskii 
and Sokolov. (Oinas 1978, 77) The reason for this was that, to the Communists, 
everything had a purpose, including culture. Although their Marxist ideology tended to 
skew this purpose toward economics, they also recognized the power that popular culture 
could have on the masses. The old ideals and morals were considered outdated, depraved, 
and useless. They saw that folk culture had been used in the past by the bourgeoisie to 
promote and maintain the elite culture, status, and agenda, and wanted to put a stop to it 
immediately. (Stites 1992, 37-38) Their solution was to eradicate folklore and culture in 
general, which became part of Stalinist culture policy beginning in 1929. However, the 
move to forbid and destroy folklore did not last long. 
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Soviet writer Maksim Gorky helped support a new state-sponsored folklore by 
convincing the Proletcul’t of the potential uses of folklore and art. In a speech made to 
the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, he showed that folklore represented the 
common people, that it expressed humanity’s deepest moral aspirations, and had high 
artistic value. Instantly, this speech opened the eyes of government leaders to the 
possibilities folklore could have in the new administration. State officials realized that 
they could use it to propagandize Soviet ideology. (Miller 1990, 8) They could unite all 
Soviet citizens, regardless of ethnicity, social origins, or occupation, under the banner of 
patriotism and loyalty, while also attempting to integrate everyone into one cultural 
identity. (Bradenberger 2002, 30) The idea that popular tradition was in the people’s 
collective memory went nicely with the ideals of communism. (Howell 1992, 396) Soviet 
officials saw folk culture as something already familiar and artistically excellent, as 
shown by its popularity and continuity throughout time, so all the party had to do was 
insert its own ideology and make it convincing and appealing to the masses. Later 
scholars would later refer to this as “folklorism” or “pseudofolklore”. It was based on 
traditional forms, which would need to be collected and maintained, but with Socialist 
ideology inserted. (Stites 1992, 38-39, 72)	  
The party initiated huge folklore collection projects. Folklorists, university 
students, and intelligentsia were drafted and sent to villages around the USSR to gather 
the local folklore. These efforts were not just about collection, but selection, too. Keeping 
communist ideals in mind, the folklorists had to choose the most appropriate folklore to 
record and bring back to the party leaders. Only that which was fit for representing the 
party was allowed to be documented. The rest, such as “thieves’ and hooligans’ songs”, 
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would be destroyed. Upon return, the folklorists’ findings would be published in 
scholarly journals and newspapers such as Pravda, the leading paper of the USSR. (Oinas 
1978, 78-80) These folk arts that were traditionally performed orally, in villages, were 
appropriated and performed through text for the masses of Soviet people, and used to 
indoctrinate them as the party saw fit. 
Besides controlling folk literature and music, the party placed great importance on 
propagandizing other forms of folklore, such as folk art. Artists were rather strongly 
encouraged to incorporate themes of socialism into their pieces. Art was seen as a legacy 
and as a tool for creating the new socialist state. (Hilton 1994, 86) Popular subjects 
included scenes of children studying diligently at school, tractors on the farm, and factory 
workers happily laboring for the party. Icon makers began to depict scenes of rural 
electrification, of Lenin speaking to an attentive crowd, or dam building. Porcelain 
dishware painters replaced traditional motifs of flowers with the hammer and sickle, farm 
tools, or red stars. (Hilton 1995, 267-270) Wooden plates and bowls, and lacquer boxes 
were painted with similar communist motifs. These things were visual and pictorial, and 
therefore didn’t require literacy to disseminate quickly and efficiently. They were also 
specifically designed to keep the elegance and traditional look of past forms, so they 
would be recognizable to people as their own folk art, but to smoothly convey communist 
images and ideals. The party believed that folk art was tied to the collective life of the 
people and during this time of great culture change, it was important to keep the “old 
peasant art” alive and invigorated. (Hilton 1995, 274) The meaning of narod changed 
slightly. Now it indicated not just peasants, but every good Soviet citizen. Officially, 
socialism was about egalitarianism, the common people, and collectivism, therefore 
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everyone was part of the narod, and the new kind of propagandized folk art was meant to 
represent everyone. 
As part of the Stalinist stance on folklore, the party decided to create new folklore 
specifically formulated as propaganda. Writers began to create new folktales, stories, 
songs, and poetry in praise of Stalin and communism. Folk artists incorporated 
communist imagery such as the red star and the hammer and sickle into their pieces. 
Themes glorifying labor, the military, the defeat of the tsars, technological advances, 
socialist construction, and Stalin himself were popular subject matter.  (Oinas 1978, 84) 
According to communist party ideals, Soviet folklore was mass produced, quickly 
disseminated, and standardized. Just as factory production of goods proliferated, so did 
factory folklore. (Olson 2004, 42)  
Officially and publically, of course, the goal was to unite all Soviet citizens as one 
group with one identity for the purposes of solidarity and harmony. This permeated all 
aspects of life. Soviet leaders engaged in the “reinvention of tradition” on a startlingly 
large scale, spreading Soviet ideals and selected parts of Russian history to the masses. 
As Eric Hobsbawm points out in The Invention of Tradition, things that groups consider 
traditional are often more recent than people remember and are often invented. The 
process of inventing traditions involves repetitively formalizing and ritualizing, and 
referencing the past. Inventors take a practice, art form, belief, or idea and through these 
processes make it traditional. (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1993, 1-6) In the case of the Soviet 
regime, leaders even went so far as to alter history books and other historical narratives to 
only include the history of the USSR. These included fabricated accounts of famous 
Soviet heroes of the recent past. This process was complicated by the fact that during the 
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Stalinist purges of the 1930s, many of these heroes were expelled from the party, and so 
were no longer considered suitable models of Soviet valor. The party had to constantly 
modify books and narratives and “search for a usable past”6 to rally and maintain popular 
support. This was especially true in the midst of Stalin’s Great Terror when many writers, 
musicians, and artists were being arrested, tortured, and executed. (Brandenberger 2002, 
34-41, 90-92) 
Although on the outside it may have appeared as though the government 
supported folk culture and art, the effect of their control actually suppressed it. Important 
characteristics that the state supported included sameness, conformity, nationalism, ease 
of dissemination, ease of understanding; anyone who tried to be creative, progressive, 
complex, or innovative (which was not common or easy to do because of the tight control 
the party had over anything artistic), was discouraged and prohibited. All citizens 
consumed the same art and culture and were subjected to propaganda. It would be 
difficult to argue that citizens were unaware of the effect the government had on art 
production, but it is safe to say that they did not have much choice in the matter. 
However, in the next decades this would begin to change. 
Folk Art in the Post-Stalin Soviet Era 
The cult of Stalinist folklore continued until his death in 1953, at which point folk 
arts gained a new freedom. When Khrushchev took over leadership of the USSR, almost 
all factions of society experienced “the thaw”. He purged the Soviet Union of Stalin by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Soviet writers engaged in this same search, using great writers of the past to create a post-revolutionary 
present. Soviet authors often portrayed revered writers, such as Alexander Pushkin, in a way that was most 
usable for their own time; that is, to create a connection between the vast cultural differences of the pre-
revolutionary past and the post-revolutionary present, to make a new narrative about themselves and their 
culture. See Angela Brintlinger’s Writing a Usable Past: Russian Literary Culture, 1917-1937 (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2000). 
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sacking bureaucrats, instituting social reforms, and promoting a more open cultural 
atmosphere (Stites 1992, 123). Folklorists decided that folklore for Stalin could scarcely 
be called folklore at all, nor did it have much connection to the idea of Russianness. They 
rejected all of the fabricated folklore of the past decade or so, condemned it as forgery 
(Howell 1992, xv), and began to turn their attentions to more serious scholarly folklore 
study. Folk artists were still required to keep themes within the general range of socialist 
ideals, but were allowed more creativity and individualism. (Oinas 1978, 92-93) 
Although more freedom was allowed in folk arts production, the state sponsored arts 
organizations still remained more popular and better supported than new art and artists. 
Throughout Khrushchev’s leadership, cultural authorities focused on industrial 
production and fulfilling production goals according to government plans.	  Creativity was 
not important, only the execution of quick and successful manufacture. (Hilton 1995, 
278) Creating art was a way for a worker to serve his government and people, and to help 
build and maintain the socialist society. Although Khrushchev removed many of the 
restraints of the Stalin era, he was still not completely open to a large change in folklore. 
His views on the subject were rooted in his “peasant” sensibilities, that is, his tendency 
towards simplicity and tradition, and therefore themes in folk arts were restricted to what 
he considered traditional and proper. (Stites 1992, 130, 146)	  
The Brezhnev era brought many improvements in Soviet life from higher rates of 
employment to urbanization to economic growth, but Brezhnev also wanted complete 
control of cultural production, particularly of folk material culture. It was during this time 
that the souvenir industry was gaining momentum, and Brezhnev wanted to manage the 
Soviet Union’s image in the world. As part of this control, he decreed that folk art was an 
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inalienable part of Soviet culture, of the narod, and needed to be protected. Folk masters 
had to be able to work in safe conditions, and there had to be exhibitions every five years 
so the public could examine the work and progress of the artists. In conjunction with 
these exhibitions, the Ministry of Culture would meet to discuss the current status of folk 
art industries and address any problems with workshops, conditions in the villages where 
arts were made, and quality of production. This increased the value of folk art. Items 
made by masters were put on display. These masters were named “Honored People’s 
Artists” of the Soviet Union and they were encouraged to be a bit more creative in their 
painting and designs. (Hilton 1995, 281-282)  
The contrast between the individual master artist and the collectivity of Soviet 
society is interesting, and shows the importance of the narod concept to the idea of 
national identity. The party was willing to give master artists more freedom to create art 
to represent the USSR, rather than let only the cheaply produced souvenir art be the face 
of the Soviet Union to the world. The factory was a part of the socialist collective. The 
master was an individual, a member of the narod, and was more valued in this situation. 
For the party leaders, Soviet image in the world was important enough to allow certain 
citizens to separate themselves from the collective with creativity in their folk art works. 
These artists were the representatives of Soviet folk culture to the world.	  	  	  
The USSR’s presence in the world began to increase due to Brezhnev’s expansion 
of the army, resulting in a larger tourist economy. With this came the tourist market, of 
which souvenir folk art was a large part. Souvenir folk arts had been sold in shops and at 
exhibitions up until this time, but because of a dearth of tourism had not become a very 
profitable industry. To keep up with increasing demand, folk art workshops were turned 
	  	  29 
into larger scale factories with standardized production of items, especially matryoshki, 
which soon became the most popular souvenir item in the Soviet Union. At first, factory 
souvenir items were sold in souvenir shops in large cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
and Kyiv. Though master folk artists continued to be revered for their work, tourism was 
a new way to make money from foreigners, using “traditional” Russian art forms. In the 
1980s small markets were set up in cities, most famously Izmailovo market in Moscow 
and Andriyivsky Uzviz in Kyiv. Vendors there sold both mass-produced factory-made 
art, and folk arts made by individual artists. The government knew that tourists would 
buy folk arts of any kind, so the focus was to provide the easiest way to make Soviet 
(Russian) culture accessible. (Ertl and Hibberd 2003, 220) With the founding of tourist 
markets, artists were able to make a profit from their creativity. As part of the free 
market, they were able to ascertain which designs and forms sell best, and use this 
knowledge to turn a greater profit. (Hilton 2002, 470) 
In 1985 when Gorbachev began his term of leadership in the Soviet Union culture 
and art were included in his new policy of glasnost, which manifested in greater freedom 
of expression. Gorbachev instituted personnel changes in the ministry of culture and in 
artists’ unions, the most famous of which was installing minister of culture Nikolai 
Gubenko, a liberal actor and film director. Restrictions on music, writing, dance, and art 
that had previously been in place were lifted. For example, criticism of politicians, 
obscene lyrics, nudity, and irreverence began to appear in all art forms (Stites 1992, 178). 
In folk art an example of this was the types of wooden nesting dolls that became popular. 
The Gorby doll, shown in Figure 2, was particularly famous for its depiction of 
Gorbachev, scar included, on the outside largest nesting doll, and inside the successively 
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smaller nested dolls each portrayed images of Gorbachev’s predecessors, the smallest 
being Stalin depicted holding a knife 
behind his back.  
Although these and other similar 
nesting dolls were made for tourists, 
the general public and Gorbachev 
himself did not seem to take offense 
to it. This new cultural openness 
continued to include other 
nontraditional images such as sports 
figures or animals on nesting dolls, and the resurgence of religious symbols on folk art 
icons and painted lacquer boxes, something that had been prohibited since 1917.  
Although certain folklorisms were still prevalent, such as the state-sponsored folk 
music ensembles, and received the majority of state funds for art, it was obvious that a 
massive change in Soviet popular culture was occurring. Western influences and the 
openness policy effected changes in film, theater, literature, dance, and music. Gorbachev 
stated that he wanted to provide a more inviting atmosphere for Soviet citizens to express 
themselves (Stites 1992, 201). Creativity, social criticism, and fun were encouraged and 
seen as the new way to narrow the gap between the government and the people. That is, if 
the government loosened its grip on popular culture and people were permitted to use art 
to express themselves, they would view the government more favorably for allowing it. 
This would strengthen the people’s trust in the government. Whether or not this was 
effective is debatable because by the end of the 1980s political unrest and revolution 
Figure 2. The Gorby doll.  
Photo courtesy of therussianshop.com. 
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would once again change the Soviet Union drastically. In the end perhaps the government 
was not successful in keeping their citizens united under the banner of communism, but 
the end result allowed more freedom of expression in art. This represented the growing 
pluralism and splintering of Soviet society of the time as well as the rising conflicting 
views and opinions on folk and popular culture of the people. (Barker 1999, 19)	  
Because of the growing autonomy of folk artists, folk art became more 
independent from government control during the Gorbachev period. Artists took back 
folk art for themselves and made a profit. Because artists had more liberty to create 
pieces more creatively, they were able to express their own personal identities through 
their art. They signed their paintings, lacquer boxes, and the bottoms of their matryoshki. 
They were not constrained by factory rules of meeting a daily quota of production, but 
rather created their arts by their own standards and choices. In Ukraine specifically, 
artists gained more autonomy and control over their folk arts compared to the past. The 
Soviet government’s stance since the 1920s had generally been that Ukrainian folklore 
and folklorists were entirely too nationalistic for the ideals of the Soviet Union and 
therefore must be suppressed. However, in the last years of Soviet rule, this suppression 
was lifted and artists were could more openly create items with Ukrainian folklore motifs, 
in Ukrainian styles of carving, embroidering, and painting, and traditional Ukrainian 
items such as pysanky that were previously banned. (Klymasz 1978, 102-103) 
After the splintering of the USSR following its break up in 1991, Russia and 
Ukraine became separate countries, and this new national and geographical separation 
began to underscore the cultural differences that many Ukrainians saw between 
themselves and Russians. Folk arts took on a new role in the political situation of newly 
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independent Ukraine. Just as souvenir folk arts were a way for the Russian Empire and 
the Soviet Union to promote national culture, so too are folk arts in Ukraine today a way 
to promote Ukrainian culture and heritage. I will expand this argument regarding 
Andriyivsky Uzviz in Kyiv to show the relationship between folk arts and politics. Before 
this it is necessary to understand more about the specific history of Ukraine during the 
Russian Empire and Soviet eras, which will serve as background information on the 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine.   
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CHAPTER III 
UKRAINIAN HISTORY AND NATIONALISM 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it has become clear that Ukraine has been 
trying to distinguish itself from Russian influence and assert its independence beyond 
geopolitical borderlines. Ukraine has a long and complex history with Russia, which is 
something that complicates this process. In this chapter I discuss a general history of 
Kyiv and Ukraine and their roles in the Russian Empire and the USSR, and how their 
relationship with Russia has changed over these years. I will then explore more in detail 
post-Soviet Ukraine’s political situation and analyze how it relates to my own research.  
History of Kyiv and the Kievan Rus’ 
Since its founding Kyiv, Ukraine has been an important city and cultural and 
historical center of Eastern Europe. Although Slavic groups had lived in the area around 
the Dneiper River for hundreds of years, historians agree that Kyiv arose as a commercial 
hub along the trade routes connecting Europe with the Middle East sometime in the late 
ninth century. The exact story of its founding is not clear, but some accounts say that 
three brothers of an ancient Slavic tribe settled in the area and built a city in honor of the 
eldest brother, Kyi. “Kyiv” then means “of Kyi”. Other accounts say a group of 
Varangians, or Vikings, came to the area from Scandinavia and founded the city. 
Regardless, the city became the capital of the political entity called the Kievan Rus’, 
which most Russians today consider to be the site of their cultural roots. It included parts 
of what are today the countries of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and other parts of Eastern 
Europe.  In 988 Kyiv’s ruler Vladimir the Great converted the Rus’ to Christianity, and 
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soon thereafter it became the largest political unit in Europe and one of Europe’s most 
beautiful cities. (Hamm 1993). 
In the following centuries, Kyiv experienced a decline, since political power was 
moved to St. Petersburg and Moscow, and Ukraine became a disputed and coveted area 
for various groups who were in power. Kyiv was destroyed by the Mongols in 1240, and 
sacked and raided intermittently by Tatars in the 15th- 16th centuries. Later in the 15th 
century Ukraine was incorporated under Polish-Lithuanian rule, though the authorities 
were never quite able to fully control the affairs of Kyiv. In the 17th century Ukraine 
became a source of struggle among Poles, Russians, and Ukrainian Cossacks, who all 
wished to control the rich land and resources.  In 1667, as the result of an agreement 
between Russia and Poland, most of Left Bank Ukraine, an area east of the Dneiper, 
including Kyiv, was incorporated into Muscovy (later known as the Russian Empire). 
Tsar Peter the Great, after declaring himself Emperor and thus making Muscovy an 
empire, focused on expanding his reach even further and made Kyiv a strategic city to 
help in this endeavor. Because of its location on the periphery of the empire, Kyiv 
became a frontier city with a blend of different peoples. By the 18th century Greeks, 
Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgars, Germans, Poles, Russians, Jews, Roma, and Ukrainians 
could be found in the city. (Hamm 1993, Kappeler 2001, Subtelny 2000)  
Ukraine in the Russian Empire  
The specifics of how Ukraine became incorporated into the Russian Empire 
marks the beginning of close Russian-Ukrainian relations. Ukraine was part of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1648 when Bohdan Khmelnitsky led a Ukrainian 
uprising for independence. This revolution continued for years as the commonwealth 
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tried to regain control, and Muscovy and Ottoman Empire became interested in taking a 
piece of Ukraine. Khmelnitsky’s revolt was too small to fight the commonwealth, so he 
began looking for allies. He found a reliable one in Muscovy, then ruled by Tsar Aleksei. 
In return for Muscovy’s assistance in fighting the commonwealth, Khmelnitsky agreed to 
swear fealty to the Tsar and give the Left Bank7, a region east of the Dneiper River, to be 
controlled by Muscovy8. Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth entered 
into a war over the rest of Ukraine in 1654, followed by a truce in 1656. Under this truce, 
Ukraine was divided into two parts, a division that remains unofficially today. Muscovy 
kept the Left Bank and Kyiv, and the commonwealth kept the Right Bank9, the region 
west of the Dneiper. Other smaller parts of Ukraine were claimed by Hungary and the 
Ottoman Empire. The Right Bank was completely subsumed into the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, particularly the region called Galicia which was furthest west. In the 
Left Bank, Ukrainians were given a modicum of autonomy, as part of the deal with the 
Tsar, but at any signs of uprising Muscovy was quick to clamp down. This region became 
known as Malorossiia, or “Little Russia”. (Kappeler 2001, 63-65; Magosci 1996, 259)  
After the establishment of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great, the Left Bank 
continued to enjoy relative independence with its own leader, or hetman, nobility, 
educational institutions, and economic policies. However, in 1764, following a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Left Bank comprised the modern day oblasts of Chernihiv, Poltava, and Sumy, the eastern part of 
Cherkasy Oblast, and the city of Kyiv. 
 
8 In Kyiv today there is a monument to Khmelnitsky, celebrating his courage in fighting for Ukrainian 
independence. Many Ukrainians consider him a hero, and will tell the story of his revolution with pride. 
Once while visiting this monument, a Ukrainian told me this story. When she recounted the agreement with 
Muscovy (Russians), she, almost with resignation, explained that he did what he had to do but it was sad 
that this began the long period of Russian control of Ukrainians.  
 
9 The Right Bank included the modern day oblasts of Volyn, Rivne, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, and 
parts of Cherkasy and Ternopil Oblasts. 
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Ukrainian uprisings, Empress Catherine II abolished the hetmanate. She did not believe 
that “Little Russians” needed any independence because their elites were being absorbed 
into the Russian nobility. Ukraine was also becoming more strategically important for the 
Russian Empire as it expanded its borders south to the Black Sea. If Ukrainians kept 
revolting, Russia could lose important resources and sea access. By the end of the 18th 
century Left Bank autonomy had vanished and the region was solidly in the control of the 
Empire. (Kappeler 2001, 66-68) 
Meanwhile, the Right Bank continued to be ruled by the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, split into smaller regions that were each administrated by a Polish 
official. As part of reforms to fully integrate the Right Bank into the commonwealth, the 
Polish king enacted religious reforms banning the practice of Orthodox Christianity. 
Beginning around the 1730s, Ukrainians protested these reforms rather strongly in a 
series of violent revolts known as the haidamak movement. The Ukrainian poet Taras 
Shevchenko would later describe the Ukrainian peasants involved, called Haidamaky, as 
heroes fighting national oppression. The eventual outcome was significant. In the final 
haidamak uprising, the Russian Empire intervened. On the one hand, the empire 
supported Orthodoxy, but this is not what guided its decisions. On the other, stronger, 
hand, if Ukrainians were successful, the empire imagined that they would try to gain 
more political, social, and economic power and independence, which could then spread to 
Ukrainians in the Left Bank. Thus, Catherine II ordered her armies to crush the 
Haidamaky in the Right Bank, a decision that would anger Ukrainians but that would also 
set the stage for acquisition of the Right Bank in the coming decades. (Magosci 1996, 
290-300) 
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With the weakening of Poland towards the end of the 18th century, the Russian 
Empire made agreements with the Austrian Empire to partition Poland. Geographically 
and culturally it made the most sense for Russia to have most of Ukraine, and for Austria 
to take territories further west. By 1795, the Russian Empire controlled all Right Bank 
Ukrainian territories once ruled by Poland, with the exception of a few western regions, 
which were ruled by Austria. (Magosci 1996, 302) It is interesting to note that at this 
time, ethnic Ukrainians made up 96% of the Left Bank population, and ethnic Russians 
only 5%. In the Right Bank, Russians were only 0.1%. (Kappeler 2001, 119-120) 
Territorially, most Ukrainians were citizens of the Russian Empire, but the divide 
between Right and Left was still apparent in the changes in the social structure of the two 
banks. In the Left Bank, the structure remained largely the same because it had already 
been a part of the empire. The Right Bank was forced to conform to the empire’s social 
policies. Social ranks were shuffled, leaving some Ukrainians in lower statuses than 
before, and many of them became serfs. (Magosci 1996, 320) This created a strong divide 
between the Russian elites and Ukrainian lower classes, particularly in the Right Bank, 
which would play into later nationalist movements in the region. 
Nationalism in Ukraine 
Nationalism in Europe as a whole arose in the 18th century. In Western Europe it 
was a result of the Enlightenment, liberalism, and secularism. (Wilson 1989, 22) Benedict 
Anderson also links it to the decline of dynastic rule and the establishment of languages 
of print media in various regions and empires. People began to question the legitimacy of 
a divine dynastic ruler, and believed freedom from this could be manifest in an 
independent, sovereign state. Printed language created distinct groups, fixity of those 
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groups, and the ability to imbue power to those who spoke and read it. People who speak 
a common language identify with each other as the same community; Anderson describes 
national communities as imagined. That is, the concept of a nation has no definition, and 
can only be felt by people who consider themselves part of a nation group. They do not 
all know each other, but find themselves united by common feelings and goals. 
(Anderson 1993, 6-7, 19, 39-45) Western Europe, then, followed a more liberal 
nationalism, in which anyone who felt themselves a part of a national group could be 
considered a member of that nation. (Wilson 1989, 23) 
In Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism took on a variant form: romantic 
nationalism. In these regions, national boundaries did not coincide with the current state 
boundaries. Nationalism was not used to protect individuals against an authoritarian state, 
but rather to redraw boundaries to match ethnic boundaries. People in these areas 
believed that each ethnic group deserved its own state, which meant that each state would 
be built on the history, culture, and traditions (including folklore) of that ethnic group. 
Most responsible for this notion is German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, who 
formulated a set of principles of nationalism that have been used up to present day by 
emerging nations. He argued that each nation was created by nature and thus it was the 
responsibility of the people of the nation to develop and support it, separately from other 
nations who could not share or understand each other’s different histories. To Herder, the 
most natural human condition was to live in nation states only with one people and one 
national character. To accomplish this, the group should proclaim its shared history, 
language, and culture to create a national character. (Wilson 1989, 22-28)  
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Folklore was an important tool in establishing this for all nations. Herder 
nebulously defined the folk as those who were organically one with their culture, who 
were most in tune with their national character, and who were spontaneous, emotional, 
and free. They were the creators and bearers of folklore, and the most valued members of 
the nation. According to Herder, folklore genres such as music, tales, legends, material 
culture, symbols, and poetry were tools to identify and differentiate groups. When groups 
formed, they used folklore to unite themselves and to highlight their differences from 
other groups. They told common stories, sing folksongs, wear traditional costume, and 
produce the arts of their ethnic group, including only positive and patriotic lore that 
supported their group goals, often looking to the past for inspiration. This then would 
result in the perfect nation state.  However, in reality, Herder’s prescription for 
nationalism created an idealized and romanticized group. Folklore justifies nationalism 
and is also created by it. Through these rose-tinted glasses, people often begin to believe 
that their nation really is the idealistic place it was made out to be, regardless of what 
reality shows. (Wilson 1989, 29-32)  
Herder’s ideas were attractive to people in Eastern Europe, and Ukraine was 
particularly interesting to him because Ukrainians were living in a multiethnic empire of 
many languages and cultures that were minimized in favor of the dominant Russian 
group. (Magosci 1996, 353) By the early 19th century the idea of nationalism had come to 
Ukraine. Several things contributed to this: the University of Kharkiv was founded in 
1804 and became the center of Ukrainian literature, the first official Ukrainian grammar 
was published in 1819, and Ukrainian poets were becoming more famous and respected. 
National poet Taras Shevchenko in particular had a lasting effect on the Ukrainian 
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language due to his creation of a standard accepted Ukrainian literary language. Finally, 
in 1846 a historian in Kyiv formed the first nationalist organization. (Anderson 1993, 74)  
Before this time, many Ukrainian residents tended to identify with multiple 
groups based on language, geographic area, and religion. Some considered themselves 
Little Russians, Russians speaking Little Russian, Vinnytsians, Galicians, Catholics, 
Orthodox Christians, etc., but the intelligentsia at the time began to spread the idea of 
mutual exclusivity by ethnicity. Russians and Little Russians could not be and were not 
the same. At the same time folklore collecting began in earnest in Russia, Ukraine began 
to do the same. They needed to collect culture and heritage to further their nationalistic 
goals. Although Russian and Ukrainian cultures were similar, they had different folktales, 
songs, art, and stories. One collector, Nikolai Tsertelev, interestingly himself ethnically 
Georgian but born in Ukraine, compared Russian folk songs with Ukrainian and declared 
Ukrainian songs to more moral and less aggressive than Russian songs. (Magocsi 1996, 
354-357) 
At the beginning of Ukraine’s nationalist movement language did not play an 
important role for Ukrainian identity because most people at the time considered 
Ukrainian, or Little Russian, to be a dialect of Russian. However in the 1820s language 
became more important, due to scholars at the University of Kharkiv. Many faculty were 
foreign-born and had been brought in by the university’s philanthropist founder to train 
imperial bureaucrats, the original purpose of the university. Soon faculty, who had 
brought with them romantic and nationalist ideas from Western Europe, became 
interested in Ukraine from an academic perspective, especially in its history and culture. 
The university began to publish anthologies and periodicals in Ukrainian, such that poets 
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like Taras Shevchenko became very famous and beloved for writing in Ukrainian and 
promoting Ukrainian nationalism10. In fact, scholars at Kharkiv were the first to begin 
referring to Ukrainians using the term Ukrainian, rather than Little Russian. Language 
became a tool to communicate and spread knowledge about Ukrainian history, literature, 
and culture in educated circles. Soon the imperial government involved itself in the study 
of Ukraine, but for its own political reasons. (Magocsi 1996, 358-359) 
In 1834 Tsar Nicholas I founded Kyiv University in Kyiv, with the ostensibly 
academic purpose of promoting Slavic studies. His actual purpose was twofold: first, by 
studying the history of Kyiv and the region, he hoped to prove that the Ukrainian 
territories were the ancestral lands of Russians (i.e. the Kievan Rus’), which would 
further justify Ukraine’s incorporation into the Russian Empire; second, by promoting 
this history, he could justify the Russification of Ukraine, particularly the Right Bank 
with its sizeable Polish population, who the tsar felt was politically unreliable. It is worth 
noting that Kyiv was on the border between the Right and Left Banks, so it was a 
strategic location chosen for its proximity to both banks and its status as an important 
historical city. Most scholars at Kyiv University were from Moscow, and while their 
research and writing on Ukraine were part of the Tsar’s political plan, they provided an 
organizational basis for Ukrainian studies in the future. Interestingly, Kyiv University’s 
Slavic studies did not seek to explicitly minimize or disparage Ukrainian national 
identity, but rather to point out that it was a valid identity in the hierarchy of nationalities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Notably there are many ethnic Ukrainian writers who have been claimed by Russia as its own. One of the 
most famous was Nikolai Gogol, who never even wrote in Ukrainian except for letters. His works are 
recognizable for his Ukrainization of the Russian language, and paradoxically, he had such a great impact 
on literature in the Russian Empire because he wrote Russian instead of Ukrainian. See Edyta 
Bojanowska’s Nikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
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in the empire, with Russian at the top, of course. And so, in its own way, the imperial 
government legitimized Ukrainian identity, at least at the beginning of its focus on Slavic 
studies. However, this legitimacy only went so far. (Magocsi 1996, 359-360) 
The imperial government supported Ukraine and Ukrainians only culturally and 
linguistically; that is, Russians considered Ukrainian culture quaint and curious, and the 
Ukrainian language an interesting dialect of Russian. However, this support did not 
extend to Ukrainian political independence. Movements such as the 1840s Cyril and 
Methodius Brotherhood of Dneiper Ukraine, who promoted Slavic equality and education 
for the masses, and the 1850s Right Bank khlopomany, who supported serf emancipation 
and democratic government, were immediately quashed and the leaders exiled to Siberia. 
These and other such movements suggested to the imperial government that Ukraine 
might want to separate from the Empire. The Empire began to more closely control 
Ukraine, arresting known populists, suppressing the use of Ukrainian language in schools 
and universities, and outlawing any Ukrainophilic, or Ukraine-supporting, political 
activity. Even the Orthodox Church in Ukraine began to discourage Ukrainian, as most of 
the high-ranking clerics considered themselves Russian and supported the state 
unquestionably. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ukrainian support movement 
tried to politicize itself by being more involved with the state government and forming 
official political parties, but this was quickly snuffed out with arrests and exiles. The 
government no longer considered Ukrainian identity as legitimate, but rather, as one to be 
controlled. Ukrainians could not gain any social, economic, or political benefits unless 
they Russified. (Magocsi 1996, 364-380) 
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Until World War I nationalism and the notion of an exclusive Ukrainian identity 
prevailed only in intellectual fringes of Ukraine in the Russian Empire. However, these 
ideas prospered in the ethnic Ukrainian region of Galicia, just to the west of the Right 
Bank, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Here Ukrainians had enjoyed a significantly less 
troubled nationalist movement that included its own newspapers, publications, cultural 
organizations, and representation in the national parliament. Peasants had been 
emancipated and could participate in public and political life. Galician Ukrainians even 
had their own military formations. All of this was with the support and encouragement of 
the imperial government. (Magocsi 1996, 382, 416) These noted differences between 
Ukraine in the Russian Empire and Ukraine in the Austro-Hungarian Empire would 
continue to affect united Ukraine’s future in the Soviet Union and later as an independent 
state. 
Ukraine in the Soviet Union 
Soon after the Revolution of 1917 what had been formerly Ukraine of the Russian 
Empire found itself a republic of the new Soviet Union, with Kyiv as the capital11. It is 
important to note that Ukrainians had their own revolution alongside the Russian 
Revolution, both of which began in 1917. Ukraine’s revolutionary era lasted for three 
years, and it was marked by competing Ukrainian political groups, peasant uprisings, 
foreign invasion, and civil war. Some wanted to declare independence and some, 
including a large contingent of Bolshevik supporters, wanted to join with Russia. After 
fighting the Red Army, Ukrainian leaders, called the Central Rada, asked Germany and 
Austria for military support. With this help they pushed the Red Army east of the Left 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The very western region of Galicia that had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire remained as such 
until 1939. 
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Bank and declared independence in 1918 as the Ukrainian National Republic. But this 
was very short-lived, lasting only a few months. Germany and Austria were only willing 
to continue military support if Ukraine would agree to provide them with foodstuffs; 
Ukraine was not willing, so they left. After two more years of conflict and weakening of 
Ukrainian nationalist leaders, Ukrainian Bolsheviks established government in Kyiv, with 
the support of Soviet Russia, and became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The 
Ukrainian Bolsheviks also acquired the region of Crimea on the Black Sea, by pushing 
out Tatar leaders and declaring it part of Soviet Ukraine. Many members of the former 
Central Rada and other nationalists were sent into exile. (Magocsi 1996, 472-502)  
Although the Bolsheviks orchestrated and supported the unification with Russia, 
they still wanted a degree of independence as a republic in the USSR, and Ukraine 
initially enjoyed a period of Ukrainization, or Ukrainian cultural revival. The Communist 
regime set up its nationalities policy, which included concessions aimed at easing the 
transition to Soviet rule. The party would allow Ukraine, and the other republics, to de-
Russify and promote their own culture and heritage, while simultaneously making the 
political changeover to Soviet rule. Ukraine took advantage of this opportunity and made 
rapid headway on the revival, which included switching to the use of Ukrainian in 
schools and public places. However, in the late 1920s, Stalin abandoned these 
concessions and while beginning his massive collectivization campaigns, also reversed 
the nationalities policy. It became clear that he wanted to eliminate Ukraine as a political 
factor in the Soviet Union. He did this by sacking Ukrainian political elites, terminating 
Ukrainization, and some scholars even suggest that Stalin purposefully orchestrated the 
famine of 1932-33. Ukrainian scholars in particular see Stalin’s excessive grain quotas as 
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a premeditated attack on Ukraine meant to prevent it from trying to gain too much power. 
Ukraine had great importance to the Soviet Union as the major producer of grains; Stalin 
may have believed they would try to starve the regime out of power by refusing to export 
grains. Other scholars argue that the famine was an unintentional result of 
collectivization, which highlighted problems in Soviet agriculture. This famine killed 
millions of peasant Ukrainians, and is known as the Holodomor, which means 
“extermination by hunger” in Ukrainian. With Ukraine sufficiently pacified after this, 
Stalin could send trusted members of his party, one of whom was Nikita Khrushchev, to 
run the republic. (Nahaylo 1999, 11-13) 
A few years later, in 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany made the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The 
Soviet Union acquired the region of Galicia, thus uniting Galician Ukrainians with the 
rest of Ukraine. The Union also acquired a small part of Romania, which became the 
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, a region where ethnic Ukrainians also lived. In 
Galicia the regime combined policies of Ukrainization, to win over the people, with 
Sovietization and political repression. (Nahaylo 1999, 14)  
After the Second World War Ukraine’s situation seemed not to have improved, 
following a series of occupations, invasions, deportations, starvation, and virtual 
colonization by Nazi Germany, the Red Army, and the surrounding countries; its desire 
for independence remained unfulfilled. To win the Ukrainians over, Stalin ultimately had 
to promise to concede a bit to their wishes. He demanded Soviet Ukrainian representation 
in the United Nations, which meant that for the first time, Ukraine would represent itself 
as an independent state on an international level. He also facilitated the return to western 
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Ukraine of around 200,000 Ukrainians who had been political refugees during the war.  
Sadly, these concessions had no lasting effects: there was no real meaning in Ukraine 
having UN representation, as it was still part of the USSR, and the returned political 
refugees were often punished for their betrayal of Soviet ideology. During the war, 
Western Ukrainian nationalists had formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and fought 
against Nazi Germany near the border of Poland; after Germany was eventually pushed 
out of Ukraine, the Insurgent Army turned on the Red Army in a struggle against the re-
imposition of Soviet rule. This fighting did not cease until the 1950s, after a series of 
Sovietization policies and mandates were put into place, including deporting up to 
200,000 Ukrainians to Russia and shipping in tens of thousands of Russians to Ukraine. 
(Nahaylo 1999, 14-17)  
Ukraine in the post-Stalin era enjoyed a brief period of de-Russification when 
Khrushchev allowed Ukrainians to move back to Ukraine, gave Crimea to Ukraine, and 
allowed Ukrainians to resume political positions both in the republic and in Moscow. 
This was short-lived, since it amounted to the regime treating Ukraine as an extension of 
Russia. Khrushchev and the Twenty-second Congress in 1961 tightened the nationalities 
policy to accelerate the fusion and merging of all people of the Soviet Union. Throughout 
the 1960s-70s Ukrainian writers, intellectuals, and other leaders of the nationalist 
movement protested and attempted to strengthen Ukrainian dissent, and though Ukrainian 
authorities tried to implement Ukrainization policies in Ukraine, their combined efforts 
were met with staunch repressive actions by Moscow. The nationalist dissenters became 
radicalized in 1975 when a group of former political prisoners set up the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Monitoring Group to expose human and national rights violations; they were 
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met with repression and arrests. As a result, more Ukrainian dissidents mobilized in 
support of independence. (Nahaylo 1999, 19-41) 
In the 1960s-1970s, economic relations between Soviet Ukraine and Russia 
complicated the political situation. In the post-Stalin era through the 1960s, Ukraine was 
relatively successful economically, but beginning in the 1970s it began to see that the 
effects of centralized planning meant to serve the interests of the Soviet empire. Its 
resources and energy were depleted, which meant that it was increasingly economically 
dependent on Moscow. Independence would be very difficult to accomplish without a 
solid economic base.  (Nahaylo 1999, 47-48)  
When Gorbachev took over rule of the Soviet Union in 1985, his new policy of 
glasnost was manifest in Ukraine with writers of the Ukrainian Writers Union exposing 
and questioning Moscow’s policies. They wrote about ecological damage, the repression 
of Ukrainian language, censorship of Ukrainian national history, and forcible 
Russification. They also wrote about the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1989. 
When the plant was built just years before, many Ukrainian scientists and authorities 
expressed concerns about labor safety, which fell on deaf ears in Moscow. The accident 
was considered another indication that Moscow did not care about Ukraine beyond what 
was necessary to keep it as part of the Soviet empire. It also became clear that the 
nationalities policies only supported ethnic Russians. Ukrainian culture and heritage were 
still suppressed. Many Ukrainians felt that the supposedly more liberal policies of 
Gorbachev were only a façade, and in fact the government had not changed its view on 
Ukraine at all. (Nahaylo 1999, 60-65)  
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This feeling galvanized Ukrainian dissidents even more, particularly in Western 
Ukraine, where the nationalist movement had always been stronger. At the end of the 
1980s, the Ukrainian Cultural Fund was established to preserve historical and cultural 
monuments, museums, and to prepare revised history and culture reference books for 
Ukraine. Ukrainian language societies sprang up in various cities. Catholic Ukrainians 
began to reopen their churches, which had been closed down and banned. More 
Ukrainians became involved in protests and the movement gained momentum. (Nahaylo 
1999, 118-121) All of this led up to the momentous day on August 24, 1991 when 
Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. It is estimated that nine out of ten 
Ukrainians supported the move to independence, which showed that the movement was 
not only one of extreme nationalists, but of the people as a whole. (Magocsi 1996, 674)  
Independent Ukraine 
Following official independence and the first presidential elections, Ukraine 
experienced complications. It had very little experience with democratic processes, 
especially since its post-communist leaders were the same leaders as its former 
Communist leaders. It was still heavily economically dependent on Russia, which by then 
was also a separate independent country, and tensions with Russia exacerbated this 
situation. Many Ukrainians felt their independence to be tenuous and maintaining it was a 
high priority. The new government asserted control over all the former Soviet military 
units stationed in Ukraine, including the Black Sea Fleet, an action that was not received 
well by Russian authorities. Ukraine and Russia also disagreed about Crimea; although it 
had been part of the Ukrainian republic under Communism, Russia claimed it. (Nahaylo 
1999, 435-441) 
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To ease the transition for former republics, leaders formed the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), which included all but the Baltic States. The CIS is a loose 
association of states that promotes peaceful political and economic cooperation among 
members. Ukraine and Russia both became members in 1991, but with different 
approaches to their membership. Russia, as the largest member, seemed to consider it a 
way to assert its authority and to maintain close ties to countries it needed – Ukraine 
being one of them. Ukraine, on the other hand, seemed to view the CIS as the most 
orderly framework to separate from Russia’s direct influence, wherein Ukraine could 
manage its own complex of problems resultant from the break up. CIS meetings provided 
peaceful settings for discussing issues among former republics, and in these meetings it 
became obvious that Russia and Ukraine disagreed on many issues. (Nahaylo 1999, 425-
429) 
Although Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin 
were able to come to bilateral agreements about some of the issues, and it was obvious 
that neither wanted to see deepening tensions between the two countries, mistrust and 
conflict continued. (Nahaylo 1999, 445) Both seemed to realize they needed the other – 
Russia needed access to the Black Sea and trade routes, and Ukraine needed energy, gas, 
oil, and other resources – but each wanted these things on their own terms, which was not 
always possible for Ukraine. Due to its dire economic circumstances, Ukraine had to 
agree to deeper economic integration with Russia, who was threatening to suspend oil 
deliveries to Ukraine if it couldn’t pay its increasing debt. Ukraine also agreed to lease 
the port of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula to Russia and divide control over the 
Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine eventually also had to offer Russia control of a section of oil 
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pipeline in Ukraine and a percentage of its refinery shares. Conflict within Ukraine about 
the constitution and parliament, and over who should be president made matters more 
chaotic in an already economically unsteady country. In 1994 Leonid Kuchma became 
president and Ukraine adopted a new constitution, which indicated a positive note of 
progress. (Nahaylo 1999, 452-456, 482-489) 
Following this, leadership in Kyiv took further steps to strengthen its relations 
with NATO, the European Union, and with other European countries and seemed to 
separate itself more and more from Russia. Kyiv was more concerned with maintaining 
relations with the rest of Europe, and parliament member and diplomat Hennadiy 
Udovenko stated that it was Ukraine’s long-term goal to be a full member of the EU. 
However, leadership did not underestimate the effects Russia could still have on Ukraine 
and the other former republics. Yeltsin was reelected in 1996, and Kuchma hoped that a 
dialogue about Ukrainian-Russian relations could be started. Instead, Yeltsin imposed a 
large import tax on Ukraine, supposedly to protect Russian interests. It had a damaging 
effect on trade and Ukraine’s fragile economy; at the time, it had just introduced its new 
national currency. (Nahaylo 1999, 516, 531)  
Despite all of these problems, Ukraine was relatively successful in its first years 
of independence. Progress was slow, but it managed to maintain peace and relative 
stability within its borders, something that could not be said for other emerging 
democracies. While political tensions continued, there was also a move to strengthen 
cultural, educational, scientific, and historical organizations in the country. Many had 
been forced to fold during the transition to independence due to lack of funding. 
(Nahaylo 1999, 549-550) Part of this was an increase in tourism, which had actually 
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begun in the 1980s. With this, the sale of souvenirs became more prevalent. Kyiv in 
particular became a popular tourist destination site. With the influx of tourists the sale of 
souvenirs became a way for many Kyivans to earn a living. For some, making and selling 
souvenirs was their only source of income. Andriyivsky Uzviz market was and is one of 
the main locations in the city to purchase souvenirs; I will show that the market is a 
vibrant site of cultural contestation. 
Language in Ukraine 
Thus, current relations between Ukraine and Russia are strained. This can be 
traced via linguistic roots. Ukraine’s name in Russian, Украйна, comes from the root 
край meaning edge or border. Interestingly, in Ukrainian the country’s name, Україна, 
though it contains the same root край meaning edge or border, comes from the Ukrainian 
word країна meaning country or nation. Though Russian and Ukrainian are similar 
languages, this small difference is represents the different ways that Russians and 
Ukrainians have viewed Ukraine. 
In more recent years, tensions between Russia and Ukraine have escalated. 
Regional ethnic and linguistic differences have divided Ukraine in to two main parts: 
East Ukraine, which has been mostly Russian-speaking and contains a higher percentage 
of ethnic Russians; and the mostly Ukrainian-speaking, more ethnically Ukrainian West 
Ukraine. According to the most recent census in Ukraine, in 2001, ethnic Ukrainians 
made up 77.8% of the population, whereas ethnic Russians were about 17%. These 
percentages vary within regions and range from the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine, 
where the Ukrainian population was about 57%, and Russians made up about 38%, to the 
Lviv region in western Ukraine, where Ukrainians were almost 95% and Russians almost 
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4%. The city of Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula is the only region where ethnic 
Russians are the majority at 71.6%. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 2001" 2003-
2004)  
Although I focus on ethnic Ukrainians in this thesis, it is important to note the 
presence of minority groups and acknowledge their influence on the dominant Ukrainian 
and Russian cultures. Ukraine contains many minority ethnic groups. At the time of the 
2001 census, these groups made up around 5-6% of Ukraine’s total population. They 
included Belorussians (0.6%), Moldavians (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Bulgarians 
(0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Poles (0.3%), Jews (0.2%), Armenians (0.2%), and Roma 
(0.1%), among others. In each oblast, or region, these percentages may be different. For 
example, in the southern oblast of Odessa, Bulgarians and Moldavians represent 6% and 
5%, respectively. In Kyiv oblast, Jews make up 0.7%. In the Chernivtsi region, 
Romanians make up 12.5% of the population. And in the Zakarpattia region, Roma 
constitute 1.1%. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 2001" 2003-2004) Ukraine has 
tended to avoid ethnic clashes in the post Soviet years, probably partially due to the 
Declaration of Rights of Nationalities, which gave citizenship to all ethnicities in Ukraine 
at independence. This policy is regarded as one of the most successful in the former 
Soviet states. (Helbig et.al. 2009, 13-14) The diversity of minority groups adds 
complexity to an already complicated society and includes ethnic and national identities 
with many languages, cultures, and types of folklore.  
Like in other former Soviet nations, ethnic differences are complicated by 
language use. Ukrainian is the official language of Ukraine, but Russian is still 
extensively used. Language splits the people of Ukraine into more categories, some of 
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which are: Ukrainians who know Russian as their first language, because of what part of 
the country they live in, or because they were born during the Soviet era; Russians who 
speak only Russian or only Ukrainian; Ukrainians who speak both languages, but refuse 
to use Russian because of nationalist feelings; Ukrainians who support using only 
Russian because it has been so widely used in Ukraine for so long; etc.. According to the 
2001 census, 95% of ethnic Russians considered their native language to be Russian, 
whereas 85% of Ukrainians said Ukrainian was their native language, which shows a 
difference in the prevalence of the two languages. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 
2001" 2003-2004) What this census doesn’t explicitly show, and what is most interesting, 
is that though Ukrainians are the ethnic majority in all of Ukraine, Russian is the 
dominant language. Many citizens speak both languages, but Russian is the language of 
public interaction, the workplace, politics, and education. Conversely, Ukrainian is the 
language of public traffic and street signs, government and business building names, 
public transportation, education, and cultural sites. (Pavlenko 2010, 149) This seems to 
complicate circumstances even further, as does the fact that Russian and Ukrainian are 
linguistically quite similar. They are both East Slavic languages, and contain only small 
differences in phonetic sounds, but have larger grammatical and vocabulary differences. 
Though they are not technically mutually intelligible, a Russian speaker and Ukrainian 
speaker could probably engage in basic communication in everyday life situations.  
It is common to overhear conversations on the streets of Kyiv that are a mixture 
of Russian and Ukrainian, and even with one person speaking Ukrainian and the other 
responding in Russian, and both understanding each other perfectly. Most Ukrainians are 
functionally bilingual, at least passively in that they may speak one language better, but 
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they fully understand the other. (Bilaniuk 2005, 3-7) These factors may contribute to the 
continuing opinions of some that Ukrainian is not necessary to living in Ukraine or that it 
is similar enough to be considered a dialect, albeit an inferior one. Many associate 
Ukrainian with provincialism, lower education, and lack of culture, while Russian is 
associated with centrality, better education, and high culture. Russians and Ukrainians 
alike can hold these stereotypes, and so it is interesting that both groups perpetuate the 
perceived similarities and differences that have produced conflict in the past. (Bilaniuk 
2005, 38) 
As described above, nationalism in Ukraine has been a significant part of its 
history, and after its independence the nationalist movement has intensified, particularly 
in relation to use and presence of the Russian language in Ukraine. During the Soviet 
period, Ukraine experienced alternating periods of Russification and Ukrainization, 
which resulted in a bilingual society. After independence Ukrainian was declared the 
official language and de-Russification of public spaces began in earnest. Russian-
language signage was completely converted to Ukrainian. Though most people spoke 
Russian, bilingual signage was uncommon, unless it was Ukrainian-English, which was 
to keep up with the new trend of using English as a global language. (Pavlenko 2010, 
145-146) More recently spoken Ukrainian has become more commonly used in some 
areas, such as in Kyiv and in western Ukraine. (Bilaniuk 2005, 3) In fact, many 
nationalist Ukrainians have come to consider native language, ridna mova, to be a 
biological phenomenon transmitted from one generation to the next, and thus the most 
important indicator of Ukrainian national identity. (Helbig et. Al. 2009, 54) 
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The Orange Revolution 
In this section I will highlight two important events of the last decade that have 
brought Ukrainian politics and language to world attention: the Orange Revolution of 
2004 and the language debate of 2012. 2004 was a presidential election year for Ukraine 
and the main candidates were Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko, two 
politicians who represented very different and opposing sides of Ukrainian political 
society. Yanukovych was prime minister at the time and was publicly backed by Russian 
president Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin, and supported by current president Leonid 
Kuchma. He was also more popular with Ukraine’s Russophones, particularly in east 
Ukraine. He is ethnically Russian, from the Donetsk Oblast of east Ukraine, and spoke 
primarily Russian. Many believed that he would strengthen relations with Russia and 
promote Slavic unity. Yushchenko, on the other hand, was self-nominated and considered 
himself the representative of the “real” Ukraine. He saw Ukraine as a member of 
democratic Europe and he wished to strengthen ties to the west. He had more supporters 
in west Ukraine and among Ukrainophones. He is ethnically Ukrainian, from the northern 
city of Sumy, and speaks primarily Ukrainian. Many Ukrainians saw him as a stark 
contrast to Yanukovych just with regard to language use. Yanukovych did not have a 
good command of Ukrainian, despite the fact that all presidents of Ukraine, by 
constitutional law, are required to show fluency in the language; he made spelling 
mistakes on his official application for presidential candidate and spoke with many 
grammar errors. Some opponents pointed out that even his Russian skills were 
questionable, too, though it was his native language. He tended to use non-standard 
jargon and offensive language, and many believed this was a reflection of corrupt 
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character. He seemed to emphasize Yushchenko’s lack of Russian use so as to make 
Yushchenko out to be anti-Russian. He also promised to make Russian an official 
language in Ukraine if elected. Yushchenko opposed this motion, but regularly spoke 
publicly in Russian to show his acceptance of Russian as a part of Ukraine. (Bilaniuk 
2005, 195-199) Russian as an official language would continue to be a divisive issue in 
Ukraine for the next eight years. 
It was obvious that Ukraine was strongly divided between the two candidates, but 
was not strictly demarcated down the usual line of east and west. Supporters of both 
could be found in all cities across the country, particularly Kyiv, which tends to fall on 
the border of east and west Ukraine. This division became very publicly visible when the 
election took place. On November 21, 2004, the day of the election, exit polls indicated 
victory for Yushchenko. However, when official results came in, Yanukovych had 
supposedly won by 2.5%. Just hours after initial exit polls were reported, official reports 
showed a huge increase in voter turnout in Yanukovych-supporting east Ukrainian 
regions, some regions showing increases from 78% to 96% overnight. Supposedly these 
voters shifted the balance to Yanukovych, giving him the votes he needed to win. 
Independent domestic monitors reported election fraud. It appeared that Yanukovych 
supporters were stuffing ballots and purposely miscounting, and teams of voters were 
being transported to polling sites and voting multiple times with multiple absentee 
ballots. (Karatnycky 2005)  
Yushchenko supporters decried this fraud as a blatant attempt by the corrupt elite 
to control the people of Ukraine. They protested for the next month, gathering in the 
streets, especially in downtown Kyiv in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square). 
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They wore orange clothing and carried orange flags; orange was the official color of 
Yushchenko’s political campaign. These protests and political negotiations, later named 
the Orange Revolution, eventually led to a new election on December 26, 2004, which 
was carefully monitored and the results showed that Yushchenko was the true winner. 
(Bilaniuk 2005, 196) Significantly, he had no party affiliation, which seemed to show that 
he and his supporters were trying to move away from the established politics of the 
country, to something more democratic and more similar to the west. He would be 
president for one term, until 2010.  
By 2007 Yushchenko began to lose popularity because of Ukraine’s political 
instability, and his Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko took greater prominence in 
Ukrainian politics. She had been a leader with him in the Orange Revolution but their 
relationship was strained due to personal disagreements. (Levy 2007) She had been 
acting Prime Minister for a few months in 2005 just after Yushchenko’s election, but he 
fired her due to internal conflicts with other senior officials. She indicated at that time 
that she would separate entirely from Yushchenko and his political aims, even saying that 
he had ruined Ukrainian unity. (Myers et al. 2005) However, she was renamed Prime 
Minister under Yushchenko in 2007. In 2010 she decided to run for president against 
both Yushchenko and Yanukovych, and as Yushchenko failed to garner support, she and 
Yanukovych became the two primary candidates.  
Yanukovych was declared president in February 2010, with a majority of the 
popular vote, and though Tymoshenko protested, Parliament saw no solid grounds for a 
revote or recount. (Schwirtz 2010) Yanukovych expressed the desire to unite Ukrainians 
under his leadership, and to give people a reason to support his future actions and 
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policies. However, he did not wish to keep Tymoshenko as Prime Minister; he hoped that 
she would resign rather than having to be ousted, which she did, albeit after extensive 
protest. Even European leaders and U.S. president Barack Obama voiced their 
congratulations to Yanukovych, stating that the election was fair and Tymoshenko did 
not have a strong case for protesting the results. (Levy (2) 2010) In fact, many leaders 
saw this election as a triumph of Ukrainian democracy. The Orange Revolution’s leaders 
may not have been in power anymore, but they allowed for this election to take place 
fairly. Ukrainians seemed to appreciate this fact, despite showing frustration with the 
state of economic and social affairs in the country. Russian president Vladimir Putin also 
showed his support for Russophone Yanukovych, who had been his choice for president 
since the last election and who had indicated that he would strengthen ties with Russia, as 
opposed to the west, as Yushchenko had. Some Ukrainian officials even postulated that 
Ukraine would be more successful and peaceful if it used Russia as a model for 
government. (Levy (3) 2010) 
Though she resigned in 2010, Tymoshenko did not disappear from the public eye, 
but rather was forced into a more prominent position when in early 2011 she was accused 
of abuse of office over a natural gas imports contract signed with Russia in 2009. 
Prosecutors said that she signed this contract knowing that Ukraine would pay higher 
prices for Russian natural gas than other countries and that this would hurt the Ukrainian 
economy. These charges were expanded to include tax evasion dating back to her time as 
the head of a private energy company in the 1990s. She and her lawyers argued that these 
charges had been fabricated by Yanukovych himself as an attempt to remove her from the 
political scene in Ukraine forever. In October 2011 she was sentenced to seven years in 
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jail in the east Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. ("Profile: Yulia Tymoshenko" 2012) The 
European Union conveyed its disappointment with the verdict, stating that this would 
affect Ukraine’s chances of being admitted to the EU in the future. Even Russian 
president Putin expressed that he did not understand why she had been jailed. ("Ukraine 
ex-PM Yulia Tymoshenko Jailed Over Gas Deal" 2011) She maintained, and still today 
maintains, her innocence. She has gone on several hunger strikes and has been 
hospitalized several times for related illnesses. Many Ukrainians support her, and she 
often receives higher opinion polls than any political leader in Ukraine. ("Profile: Yulia 
Tymoshenko" 2012) 
At the time of my research, protesters for Tymoshenko could be seen lining 
Khreshatyk Street in downtown Kyiv in white tents with signs declaring, “I’m for 
Tymoshenko” in Ukrainian. They stood with posters and placards, handing out 
information about her court case, and denouncing the actions of the Yanukovych 
administration. They also distributed stickers that say in Ukrainian, “I’m against 
Yanukovych!”, shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 shows some of the posters seen on 
Khreshatyk during summer 2012. They depict her in 
parliament, in crowds of Ukrainians, smiling, interacting 
with them. Her hair is blond, like the original Kievan Rus’ 
people, and it is braided in a traditional Ukrainian way, and 
also resembles a halo. She is a symbol of Ukrainianness and 
culture. She wears light colors, which are a symbol of purity 
and does not use excessive amounts of ornamentation or 
Figure 3. "I'm against 
Yanukovych!" 
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cosmetics. These photos give her a very positive image; she is one of the people, and she 
cares about Ukraine. She is in the midst of adoring crowds who see her as the honest 
woman she claims to be. These images are somewhat ironic because Tymoshenko was 
also known as an oligarch in the early 1990s when she was the head of an energy 
company, and at the time was one of the richest Ukrainians. She is also known to be a 
bold and fiery orator, and one who at times can be argumentative and aggressive. 
Supporters seem to see her as standing up for their rights and views. She is a strong 
leader who is not afraid to be daring. 
 
Figure 4. Posters of Yulia Tymoshenko set up by her supporters on 
            Kyiv’s Khreshatyk Street, July 2012 
The 2012 Language Bill and Debate 
Although Yanukovych seemed to have gained the trust and support of many 
Ukrainians when he became president, this was not true for all. He has stated that part of 
his foreign policy goal is to strengthen ties with Russia, something that nationalist-
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leaning Ukrainians have not been supportive of in the past three years. Most recently, in 
June 2012, this included passing a bill to give the Russian language a higher status in 
Ukraine. Kyiv Post newspaper reported that the bill was rushed through parliament just 
minutes after a surprise proposal by one majority party leader, which gave opponents 
almost no time to cast their vote. The bill didn’t officially make Russian a second official 
language but it recognized Russian (and other languages such as Bulgarian and 
Hungarian) as a “regional” language in primarily Russian-speaking areas of the country, 
such as many regions in east Ukraine. Opponents argued that it was a symbol of 
Moscow’s continuing influence on Ukraine, a dilution of Ukrainian national identity, and 
a deepening of the rift between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. (Reuters 2012) 
("Ukrainian Opposition Protests Russian Language Bill" 2012)  
Ukrainians all over the country began protesting the bill immediately, especially 
in Kyiv. People gathered in the city center, near parliament and other government 
buildings, carrying signs and placards, playing drums, shouting in bull horns, wearing 
Ukrainian national costume, painting their bodies in yellow and blue paint representing 
the colors of the Ukrainian flag, as symbols of their national pride and solidarity. They 
had altercations with police, often starting fights themselves. Figure 5 shows a small, 
peaceful group of protesters in July 2012 who assembled on the steps of Ukrainian 
House, a large exhibition-presentation complex situated on European Square at one end 
of Khreshatyk Street. Many Ukrainian national flags are visible, and there are also some 
red and black flags. These colors were used on the flags of underground Ukrainian 
nationalists during World War Two (Pancake 2010), and they became a new symbol for 
the language debate. Protesters say red signifies freedom and black signifies death, so the 
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sentiment is “freedom or death”. It is obvious that the question of language is more than 
just speaking, reading, and writing for these Ukrainians. 
 
Figure 5. Protesters of the 2012 language bill, July 2012 	  
In August 2012 President Yanukovych signed the language bill into law. Protests 
have continued, despite Yanukovych’s reassurances that the bill doesn’t affect Ukrainian 
at all, but rather makes Russophones more comfortable in their own country, which he 
argues is good for Ukrainian unity. (Balmforth 2012) In recent months the president has 
also tried to appease protesters by including funding in the 2013 national budget for 
Ukrainian language development and reiterating that Ukrainian must be protected in 
Ukraine. Parliament has said that the language bill may even be put to referendum, since 
the constitution explicitly states that Ukrainian is the only official language. ("Russian 
Language Status May Be Put to Referendum, Rada Should Have Final Say" 2013)  
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There are already some measures put in place that protect Ukrainian to a certain 
extent. For example, in television and radio, according to national law, half of all 
programming must be Ukrainian-language programming. However, in practice, these 
requirements are not always met. In print media, books, magazines, and newspapers are 
more commonly sold in Russian rather than Ukrainian, which also gives the impression 
that Russian is favored. Some Ukrainians have such strong feelings about the language 
debate that they no longer speak Russian, especially in public. They may refuse to answer 
if addressed in Russian, or even boycott restaurants or other establishments that don’t use 
Ukrainian. (Shevchenko 2012) The western Ukrainian city of Lviv even declared the 
language law invalid in its region just two months after Yanukovych signed the bill into 
law. ("Lviv Regional Council Declares Language Law Invalid on Region's Territory" 
2012) Lviv is known for being particularly nationalistic and is primarily Ukrainian-
speaking, so this came as no surprise.  
The language debate in Ukraine represents more than just having the choice of 
languages to speak. It represents for some Ukrainians an attack on their heritage and 
culture. With its long history under Russia as a territory, a Soviet republic, and even now 
as an independent country, still in Russia’s sphere of influence, Ukraine has long felt 
oppressed. Having a unique language is one of the primary tenets of being a nation; 
without it, Ukrainians feel that their identity is not complete and is being snuffed out. The 
conflictive history with Russia makes some Ukrainians understandably wary of Russian 
having an official status in Ukraine, after nationalists have made efforts to resist Russian 
influence. This debate is representative of the political relations between Russia and 
Ukraine and a whole. They have a tenuous relationship in which both need each other; 
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however, whereas Russia would like to keep Ukraine as close as possible, Ukraine is 
struggling to escape the weight of Russian influence to make its own path as a fully 
independent nation.   
Current Events 
On the other hand, recent events have shown that Ukraine and Russia’s 
relationship may be growing closer. After initially deciding in 2012 to pursue political 
and trade agreements with the European Union, in November 2012 Ukraine’s cabinet of 
ministers announced that it would suspend these plans and instead focus on new 
agreements with Russia and other former Soviet countries. EU leaders expressed 
disappointment with this development and stated that if Ukraine passes on this 
opportunity, it was unlikely to receive another in the future. Although President 
Yanukovych did not give reasons for his decision, it appears that they are twofold. First, 
an unofficial condition of signing EU agreements was that Yulia Tymoshenko had to be 
freed. EU leaders believed that her imprisonment was politically motivated, merely a way 
for Yanukovych to keep the popular figure from running against him in elections. 
(Herszenhorn (2) 2013) Second, President Putin of Russia made threats of cutting off gas 
exports to Ukraine (which supply 60% of its gas needs), and stopping all Ukrainian 
imports at the border. (Herszenhorn (3) 2013) Analysts say Putin viewed the EU as a 
threat from the west trying to overrule Moscow’s power in Ukraine, though Putin himself 
told reporters that Ukraine’s decision was entirely internal. Other analysts have 
speculated that Yanukovych may have rejected the EU agreement in order to force the 
EU to offer more support in case Russia cut off energy shipments. However, 
Yanukovych’s statements suggest that this was a long-term decision. (Williams 2013)  
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The potential loss of Russian trade is no joke; Russia has recently cut off trade 
with other former Soviet countries seeking stronger EU ties. Armenia had been on track 
to stronger EU trade agreements until September 2013 meetings in Moscow appeared to 
change President Serzh Sargsyan’s mind. He declared that Armenia would scrap its EU 
plans and join the Kremlin’s customs union. In September 2013, after Moldova began 
talks with the EU, Russian officials banned Moldovan wine, one of the country’s most 
important exports, and threatened to halt gas supplies during winter. There were rumors 
that Moldovans working in Russia would be expelled and that Moldovan apple exports 
would be refused. However, President Nicolae Timofti has stated he will not let these 
threats deter Moldova’s EU aspirations, as it has long had goals of unification with the 
west. (Herszenhorn (3) 2013) 
For Ukraine, the decisions are complicated, and the last decade has made it 
obvious that the relationship with Europe and Russia must be balanced. Despite the 
recent strengthening of Ukraine’s alignment with Russia, many Ukrainians disagree with 
their government’s actions. Protesters gathered in Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv 
chanting, “Ukraine is Europe!” to show their support for EU accession. (Herszenhorn (2) 
2013) It is clear that many people support Ukraine’s right as an independent country to 
move away from Russian influence.  
The nationalistic struggle manifests in other parts of Ukrainian life as well, such 
as history textbooks, as Jan Germen Janmaat illustrates (2005). The complex nature of 
ethno-linguistic groups in Ukraine makes it difficult for authors and educators who write 
textbooks to certainly agree about what Ukraine’s national identity is (this is difficult in 
many countries). The way Ukrainian history is portrayed in textbooks has a powerful 
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influence on children, whether the portrayal is positive, negative, exclusionary, inclusive, 
or otherwise. Janmaat notes a tendency of textbooks to favor the ethnocultural approach 
that touts ethnic Ukrainians as the most important group that determines national identity 
through culture and language. Books do acknowledge the presence of other ethnic groups 
but often place them in opposition to Ukrainians. Ethnic Russians in particular are 
depicted as outsiders who dominated the eastern part of the country, but who cannot stake 
a legitimate claim to those lands. Janmaat’s conclusions point to potential future change 
towards a less nationalistic approach in the textbooks. However, he underscores the 
importance of the political climate in determining these changes. (2005, 20, 28-30, 35) 
The author’s study shows that nationalistic education in Ukraine begins in childhood, and 
is therefore part of many Ukrainians’ mentalities. This example illustrates how 
nationalism permeates Ukrainian life in ways that are not explicitly political. In the 
following chapter I describe and analyze another small part of nationalism in Ukrainian 
life: Ukrainian souvenir sales in Andriyivsky Uzviz souvenir market in Kyiv.   
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CHAPTER IV  
ANDRIYIVSKY UZVIZ SOUVENIR MARKET IN KYIV 
The following chapter describes and analyzes Andriyivsky Uzviz through a 
performance studies lens, based upon my fieldwork completed in summer of 2012. By 
taking this approach, I show that the market is not only a place of economic profit, but 
also one of cultural heritage promotion and performance for the Ukrainians who make 
and sell folk arts there. The Uzviz contains more than folk artists and folk arts, including 
cafes, museums, and other types of souvenirs such as contemporary and Soviet 
memorabilia items. I will describe these things in the following pages; however, I will 
focus my analysis on folk arts and folk art vendors (focusing on one artist) because here I 
locate the most interesting Ukrainian cultural promotion. This chapter discusses the 
history and spatial dimensions of the market as well as the people involved (vendors and 
customers), and the material contents of the market. I also explore the possible meanings 
of objects and their production and transaction within Ukrainian culture and between 
Ukrainians and international tourists. 
Overview of the Market and its Surroundings 
Andriyivsky Uzviz means “Andrew’s Descent” and it is the name of the street on 
which the market is located. It begins at the top of Old Kyiv Mountain, and snakes down, 
ending near one of Kyiv’s main squares, Kontraktova Square. St. Andrew’s Church, 
shown in Figure 6, which was built in the 18th century, sits at the top of the mountain and 
is what gives the street its name. From almost anywhere on the Uzviz, visitors will see 
the large robin’s egg blue church jutting upwards to the sky. Near St. Andrew’s, the street 
morphs from asphalt to old cobblestone, smooth and shiny from hundreds of years of 
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wear. There is a small square at the base 
of the church on which sometimes 
musicians or dancers perform for the 
passersby.  
The street originates at the 
confluence of two other streets, 
Desyatynna and Volodymyrska, which 
come together at an acute angle just uphill 
to the east from the church. About one 
half of a city block uphill from the merge 
point is a short connecting street between 
the two streets. This forms a small 
triangular shaped piece of land, where a few souvenir stands and food carts are located.  
Shown in Figure 7 is where the two streets come together. The red tents are food carts. 
On the left is the outer wall of St. Andrew’s, and on the right are souvenir stands. 
The Uzviz has been an historic artists’ street for hundreds of years. Some have 
compared it to the Monmartre in Paris or Old Arbat in Moscow. Many writers, artists, 
merchants, and craftspeople lived on the Uzviz and displayed their works and wares in 
galleries, shops, and outside on the street.  Today, the buildings still contain not only 
galleries, shops, and museums, but also cafes, restaurants, and other points of interest. 
Along the north side of the street itself where there are no stalls, artists (often students of 
the nearby art academy) can be observed creating and selling their works, but the 
souvenir stalls and stands make up most of the market. 
Figure 6. St Andrew's Church 
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The specific history of the Uzviz is 
unclear. There is a dearth of scholarly 
research on it, and travel websites in English, 
Russian, and Ukrainian do not provide many 
details. Based on its history as an artists’ 
street where craftspeople and artisans have 
worked and sold items for many years, it 
seems that the market formed gradually and 
organically from this past. One quarterly 
online magazine, Ukraine Magazine, whose 
website seems not to have been updated since 
2007, indicates that it was founded sometime in the 1980s, but does not state exactly 
when, or who founded it. (Budko) From the information I could gather from vendors, it 
seems that people began selling folk art souvenirs there because it was one of the most 
popular tourist areas in Kyiv in the 1980s when international tourism to Ukraine began to 
increase.  
Four food carts and music performance spaces for busking are located in the small 
square at the top of the Uzviz. Vendors sell soda, bottled water, candy, ice cream, beer, 
and other snack items, which are convenient for visitors to consume while shopping. Two 
of these stands have plastic chairs and tables for public use. These are the only places to 
sit on the street, and are important on a hot summer day. In summer it is common to see 
visitors walking down the Uzviz enjoying an ice cream while perusing the souvenir 
selection. On weekends music performances are common; often there is just a single 
Figure 7. The top of Uzviz 
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performer, such an accordionist playing traditional Ukrainian folk music; or there may be 
a small group of guitarists singing contemporary music, collecting tips in an open case. 
Music adds to the festive tourist atmosphere at Andriyivsky Uzviz.12  
Figure 8 depicts a map of the 
Uzviz, shown with Ukrainian labels. 
Most tourists or potential shoppers enter 
Andriyivsky Uzviz at the top of the 
mountain, either by following 
Desyatynna Street or Volodymyrska 
Street towards the confluence near St. 
Andrew’s Church. The three colors 
denote different categories of buildings 
or sites with local, national, or cultural 
significance. Number 23 on the lower 
right corner of the map is St. Andrew’s 
Church. Below and to the right is the 
small square and the intersection of Volodymyrska and Desyatynna Streets. Around 
number 21 is the dividing line between the upper Uzviz and the lower Uzviz.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Music in the Uzviz is another topic entirely, and I omit it from this thesis because it is very complex and 
deserves more discussion than my limited knowledge could provide. While Ukrainian folk music is 
common in the Uzviz, it is important to acknowledge that other ethnic groups – including but not limited to 
Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, Poles, Tatars, Jews, and Roma – in Ukraine have their own musical 
traditions, some of which perform in Andriyivsky Uzviz. This complicates national and cultural expression 
in the Uzviz, and contributes to the market’s diversity. For more information on music in Ukraine, both in 
the Soviet and post Soviet eras, see Adriana Helbig’s chapter entitled “Ukraine” in The International 
Recording Industries (ed. Lee Marshall, Abington: Routledge, 2012), and the chapter entitled “Music” in 
Adriana Helbig, Oksana Buranbaeva, and Vanja Mladineo’s Culture’s and Customs of Ukraine (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2009). 
Figure 8. Map of the Uzviz 
	  	  71 
Maintenance and Regulation of the Market Space 
In the last 15 years there have been several important instances when the city 
involved itself in market activities. One was in 2000 when the Podil District 
Administration (PDA) attempted to ban vendors from selling in the market during the 
winter weather months between December and May, citing the hazard of hanging icicles’ 
potentially falling and injuring market visitors. Vendors and artists immediately 
organized and formed a group called the Kyiv Creators to protest the ban. Winter 
holidays provide a chance for vendors to earn income during an otherwise slow business 
season. A spokesperson for Kyiv Creators’ 200 members expressed that for most 
vendors, selling in the market is their only source of income; selling in winter is critical 
for them to make their living. Members wrote letters to government heads, picketed 
government buildings, and alerted the media. The PDA soon rescinded the ban. It also 
allowed issuance of more trade licenses, although it had previously stated there were too 
many vendors on the street. The head of the PDA even promised that while he was in his 
post, there would be no further bans on trade in the Uzviz. ("Artists Face Eviction from 
Andriyivsky Uzviz." 2000; "Craftsmen Can Now Call Andriyivsky Uzviz Home" 2000) 
Another example of positive city involvement in the Uzviz was in 2002 when the Kyiv 
City State Administration decreed it under protected status, which established specific 
construction rules disallowing demolition of any buildings or renovating without 
approval by the Department for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Sites. Also in 
2012 the Ministry of Culture granted the Uzviz the status of an urban architecturally 
significant site, which makes every building and the street itself a historical site. 
(Maksymenko et al. 2012) 
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Many buildings along the Uzviz have been renovated and repainted recently, as 
part of a restoration project by the city (Maksymenko et al. 2012, Shevchenko (2) 2012). 
The new building facades have been painted in bright colors and decorated with hanging 
flowerpots. The sidewalks have been remade with new red brick cobblestone. As of July 
2012, the buildings that had not yet been finished being renovated were draped with 
canvas that had been painted to look like a building façade, as seen in Figure 9. The 
colors and newness of the buildings and canvasses evoke a constructed, purposed 
atmosphere, almost like that of a theatre stage. The canvases indicate that the city enacted 
a careful plan to create 
the Uzviz’s image. 
Other streets being 
renovated in Kyiv do 
not look like the Uzviz. 
They are less likely to 
be painted in such 
whimsical colors, and 
are less likely to be 
fitted with canvas 
facades during restoration. This suggests that the Uzviz occupies a special category in 
city renovators’ plans, and also represents a valued part of the city, not only because of its 
historical significance, but because it brings tourism to Kyiv. It is also the site of various 
art festivals during the year and the Kyiv Day celebration in May, in which many 
Kyivans participate. 
Figure 9. Uzviz renovation facades 
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Despite the hazy history of the souvenir market, it is clear that the Uzviz is a 
culturally significant street in Kyiv, and the market within is valuable to Kyivans. In fact, 
some Kyivans refer to the Uzviz as a museum with no roof, implying that its contents are 
meant to be protected and maintained. It is particularly vital to artists and vendors, whose 
primary purposes are selling souvenirs and catering to tourist visitors. It must maintain its 
image and market atmosphere to remain within the parameters of what tourists expect. 
The only changes that are made are those that are perceived to enhance the market, i.e. 
renovating buildings. Vendors must follow certain city rules in order to sell: gain a permit 
from the city, which costs about 100 USD, and pay a monthly fee of about 5 USD and an 
annual fee of about 20 USD to sell on the street during open hours of the day. Permanent 
stalls are rented out by the city, but non-permanent stalls’ locations are regulated by 
vendors themselves. They must also agree to register their items on the permit to ensure 
that only acceptable souvenir items are sold. Regardless of origin, acceptable items are 
Russian or Ukrainian folk arts, contemporary items like t-shirts and magnets that have 
some connection to Russian or Ukrainian culture (i.e. a t-shirt that says “I love Kyiv”, or 
a magnet depicting a Ukrainian peasant hut), Soviet memorabilia, and anything that is 
handmade by an artist, even if it is not a type of folk art. Wares with no connection to 
Russian, Ukrainian, or Soviet culture are not permitted (i.e. blank coffee mugs or cheap, 
imported jewelry). I give specific examples of wares, especially folk arts, in the following 
pages. The PDA regulates vendors and wares as much as possible; however, at the lower 
end of the Uzviz unlicensed squatters often try to sell items such as plastic children’s 
toys, modern clothing like blue jeans, or cheaply made jewelry. If discovered, these 
squatters are immediately forced to leave the Uzviz, but it is difficult to regulate this.  
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Before renovations, many residents of Kyiv felt that the street was in great need 
of repair, specifically because it was a popular tourist destination. Kyiv Post newspaper 
extensively covered the renovation process from the beginning, reporting on progress and 
interviewing Kyiv residents to find out what they thought of it. Post reporters also 
documented protests after billionaire businessman Rinat Akhmetov proposed 
demolishing an historic building on the Uzviz to make room for a modern office building, 
as part of the Uzviz renovations. (Shevchenko (4) 2012) Their reports quote wary 
residents worrying that the renovations might not be done correctly, that the atmosphere 
and beauty of the Uzviz might be compromised for more modern looking buildings, and 
hoping that there would be enough money to finish. (Shevchenko (3) 2012) Renovations 
began in early 2012 and were planned to be finished by May 2012, in time for the Kyiv 
Day celebrations. At the time of my research in summer 2012, renovations were still 
ongoing.  
The Uzviz represents Kyiv to many tourists. The ability to present the Uzviz as a 
modern, yet traditional tourist spot where visitors can experience historic Kyiv is a point 
of pride for many vendors. It is also a source of collective identity for them. They are 
quick to recount tidbits of Ukrainian history or provide recommendations on which café 
to visit, and they always know the life stories of famous Ukrainians who lived on the 
Uzviz. They recount which buildings are the oldest and what used to be housed in them. 
The Uzviz is not only their workplace, but also their home. Vendors say that the market’s 
main purpose is to sell souvenirs as well as to provide an experience to visitors. They 
want to create an atmosphere that imparts upon visitors the feeling that they have 
experienced something uniquely Ukrainian. This significance was adopted by city 
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renovators; each building has been renovated according to a specific city plan, to keep the 
historical and cultural aspect of the Uzviz’s traditional image. 
The Market’s Vendors and Wares 
Souvenirs are the material culture of travel, events, relationships, and memories. 
As I describe them in this thesis, they are items tourists take away and collect that have 
various uses, but generally serve as mementos of travel. The object may have a practical 
function, such as a piece of clothing or a painted bowl, but the meaning of the souvenir 
symbolizes much more. Items carry value for many reasons: their monetary value, their 
place in home décor, their indications of wealth or class, and their personal meaning to 
the traveler, among others. (Graburn 2000, xii-xiii) Anna Pechurina points out that 
immigrants may use souvenirs as markers of national or cultural identity in their new 
country. (2011, 97) Michael Hitchcock illustrates that souvenirs can be used as symbols 
of indigenous identity and solidarity. (2000, 8) Although I do not focus on the specific 
meanings of Uzviz souvenirs to tourists, I later explain that items are perceived to have 
authenticity in different ways, and these perceptions affect what vendors sell and what 
tourists buy. In the Uzviz there are different kinds of souvenirs in the two main areas of 
the market.  
I have termed The Uzviz’s two parts upper and lower. The upper part consists of 
mass-produced souvenir items sold in permanent concrete and sheet metal stalls, mostly 
on the west side of the Uzviz. Here, most vendors say that they sell souvenirs solely to 
make a profit. They are interested in selling items that have proven to be popular with 
tourists, which may or may not include folk arts. They successfully sell wares because of 
their position in the upper Uzviz, where most tourists enter the market; tourists often 
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purchase souvenirs from one of the first stalls they see. People are often deterred by the 
steepness of the rest of the Uzviz: walking back up a steep street in the heat of the 
afternoon is usually something to avoid. Often upper Uzviz stalls have a mixture of 
contemporary items like t-shirts and coffee mugs, Soviet memorabilia, and some folk art 
items. Some stalls sell all three, or else one or two types of items. Soviet memorabilia 
(old and worn, and are often war-related) is the only souvenir type in a few stalls. Old 
canteens, soldiers’ hats or helmets, propaganda posters, and firearms and knives 
sometimes sit next to a cheerfully painted wooden bowl or colorful coffee mugs. Most 
stalls have a combination of contemporary souvenirs and traditional folk arts. 
Contemporary souvenirs include coffee mugs, shot glasses, commemorative ceramic 
plates and bells, t-shirts, and refrigerator magnets. Some coffee mugs have simple 
slogans such as “I love Kyiv”, or “Kyiv, Ukraine” and a picture of a famous cathedral, 
and some are more intricately designed with actual cityscapes, and some have illustrated 
pictures depicting two traditionally dressed Ukrainian men dancing and drinking. Shot 
glasses tend to be simpler, and only say “Kyiv” or show a simple picture of a church. 
Ceramic plates and bells sometimes have pictures of various points of interest in Kyiv, 
such as churches, museums, or monuments.  
In the summer of 2012 Kyiv was host to the Union of European Football 
Association’s Euro Cup in soccer, and souvenir t-shirts were a popular item in the Uzviz. 
Other popular novelty t-shirt designs seem to have Russian references, such as replicated 
pictures of Soviet propaganda posters, or images of Cheburashka, a Russian children’s 
cartoon, or the golden arches of a certain well-known fast food restaurant with 
“McLenin’s” written instead of “McDonald’s”. Refrigerator magnets include simple 
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images of Kyiv, or a traditional Ukrainian hut, or a small wooden plate. With the 
exception of these magnets, most items in the upper Uzviz do not relate to Ukrainian folk 
arts, or even to Ukrainian culture. Rather, they are consistent with other contemporary 
souvenir base forms, such as the t-shirt or coffee mug, found around the world. They can 
be customized to be sold anywhere. Although these types of souvenirs were not common 
in Kyiv before the early 1990s, they seem to be quite popular now. The majority of 
souvenir stands in the upper area of Andriyivsky Uzviz contain at least one of these 
types.  
Most vendors of souvenirs are middlemen, that is, they order their wares from 
factories or artists and then sell them in the Uzviz. Towns such as Chernigov, Donetsk, 
and others have souvenir factories, and some vendors insist that all of their wares come 
from such factories. However, many vendors admit that at least some of their items were 
made in China or Vietnam. In fact, some vendors worry about the effect of imported 
souvenirs. Factories and artists in Ukraine simply can not keep up with the manufacturing 
capacity of China. Souvenir vendors and artisans often have to compete with 
commercialized factory production, and must work hard so that their items bear a mark of 
“authenticity” to attract tourists to purchase them. They are bound by tourist preferences, 
but there also must be balance between these preferences and what the vendor or artist 
has the ability to sell. (Herzfeld 2004, 1) While it may be cheaper for a vendor to sell 
Chinese-made souvenirs, tourists will not always purchase an item labeled “Made in 
China” because it lacks the authenticity of having been made in Ukraine. For this reason, 
some vendors have resorted to deliberately removing “Made in China” labels in order to 
sell the items more successfully. To add another dimension, some items made in China 
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contain dangerous substances, such as lead paint, which vendors and tourists alike may 
have no way of detecting. Moreover, because they have no direct connection to the 
production of the souvenirs, middlemen may be more focused on profit than an artist who 
sells his or her own works in the market, and may not check the safety of the items. These 
issues reflect the lack of effective management of the Uzviz, and the lack of enforcement 
of the registration policy that vendors are required to complete. (Kalenska 2012)  
The lower Uzviz is a different story. There are no permanent stalls, only wooden 
or metal structures which are portable and taken home with the vendor each night. They 
also contain fewer of the mass-produced items that are so prevalent in the upper part. 
Vendors here are more likely the makers of the wares they sell, and thus concerned with 
more than just economic profit. They are interested in promoting themselves as artists 
and in differentiating themselves and their art from the vendors and mass-produced 
souvenirs in the upper Uzviz. Often wares in the lower Uzviz are classified as 
“traditional” Ukrainian folk arts. Labeling an item as “traditional” can be problematic, 
but to help with this I use Barre Toelken’s conceptualization as a pre-existing set of 
cultural characteristics and conditions that influence a performer more than his or her 
own preferences or tastes (1996, 37). This is to say that a performer of traditional folklore 
favors qualities and techniques that reference how folklore was created in the past, 
according to cultural custom and preference. I use this definition throughout because it 
takes into account the performer’s agency, something that is important in Andriyivsky 
Uzviz. 
For many vendors and artists in the lower Uzviz, choosing what to make and sell 
is influenced by what they view as Ukrainian traditional culture. When asked, some will 
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explicitly say that they only sell Ukrainian arts because they want to show tourists what 
Ukrainian culture is. They believe that as vendors in the Uzviz they have a responsibility 
to display Ukrainian items. A common misconception of tourists who are not familiar 
with Ukrainian culture is that Ukrainian folk culture is almost the same as that of Russia. 
This is probably related to Ukraine’s relatively recent independence; in the Soviet era and 
before, Russians and Ukrainians were considered parts of the same cultural group, with 
slight differences. As a result of this, some tourists come to the Uzviz expecting to find 
Russian folk art souvenirs – which they do find, in some stalls. Matryoshki are very 
popular and their mere presence in the Uzviz, probably in the upper area, perpetuates the 
misconception that they are Ukrainian.  
In addition, it is true that there is some overlap in what scholars consider 
traditional Russian and traditional Ukrainian folk art. Painted wooden plates, bowls, and 
spoons, and some types of lacquer boxes, can be found in both cultures. Some Ukrainian 
material arts may also be found in other Slavic folk art traditions, such as Czech and 
Slovakian painted eggs. To complicate this further, there are some Ukrainians who make 
Russian folk arts, as is the case of one lacquer box artist I will profile later in this chapter, 
and vice versa. The complex interaction of Russian and Ukrainian folk arts and culture in 
the Uzviz shows that the notion of “traditional” cannot have an objective definition. 
However, it is important to note that I am interested in portraying the artists’ and 
vendors’ points of view of what defines an item as traditional or not; Ukrainian arts 
vendors in the Uzviz know what they consider to be traditional and many of them hope to 
show tourists precisely “authentic” Ukrainian folk arts.  
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For these vendors, traditional souvenir items are those that have roots in 
Ukrainian history. For example, a traditional Ukrainian embroidered blouse is one that is 
made from white fabric and red or black embroidered thread because these are the 
materials and colors Ukrainians used in the past and that came to be associated with 
Ukrainian culture. Several vendors, such as the one in Figure 10, sell only traditional 
Ukrainian embroidery on tablecloths, napkins, blouses, dresses, and even small 
bookmarks. The most common color combination is red thread on a white cloth 
background, but there are other colors as well. Today the embroidery is done with 
machines, but vendors consider hand-sewing more traditional. Floral and geometric 
motifs are common, with popular designs varying regionally in Ukraine.  
 
 Figure 10. An Uzviz embroidery stall 
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Another example of traditional Ukrainian art is painted eggs, or pysanky, shown 
in Figure 11. They are arguably the most Ukrainian of souvenirs and most Ukrainians 
would consider them to be very traditional, because they have a long history in Ukrainian 
folk culture, dating back before Christianization. Historically pysanky were made of real 
eggs, and the designs were drawn with colored beeswax. Now souvenir pysanky are 
usually made of wood, and are painted in great detail, meticulously designed, usually in 
black, red, and yellow paints, though all 
colors and new designs can also be found. 
Sometimes they also come with a display 
stand that looks a bit like a candlestick 
holder and is painted in a similar fashion 
to match the pysanka.  
 Although pysanky are 
quintessentially Ukrainian, they are not 
found in most souvenir stalls in the Uzviz. This may be due to the influence of Russian 
culture on souvenirs in Kyiv, or the economic fact that tradition is not always the first 
priority for sales. As Iancu and Tesar note in their discussion of the politics of Romanian 
peasant art, sometimes, due to market demand and financial constraints, vendors can not 
produce or sell art that would be considered more traditional. Vendors must be flexible 
with where they procure their wares because such business decisions depend on customer 
preferences. (2008, 60) In the Uzviz it is the same; many vendors focus entirely on profit 
because the market is their livelihood. They do not have the luxury of picking and 
choosing the most traditional Ukrainian items to sell just because they are Ukrainian. 
Figure 11. Pysanky 
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Pysanky simply do not sell as well as other types of souvenirs. They are often more 
expensive because of their detail and design, and many tourists prefer to buy other items. 
Because of this preference, few vendors sell pysanky in the Uzviz. This shows the 
complexity of negotiating vendors’ economic and cultural roles as sellers of folk art. It 
also indicates the importance of profit in the market. It is easy to romanticize artists and 
vendors of traditional Ukrainian arts, but the reality is that many cannot afford to sell 
only what is traditional. Their livelihoods depend on sales and this means they must sell 
what tourists will buy.  
Although souvenir folk arts are considered traditional and modeled after old 
forms, many are in fact mass-produced. However, in this case, mass-produced does not 
mean mechanized production. Items such as painted wooden spoons, pysanky, and 
lacquer boxes usually cannot be carved and painted by machines. Many are made in 
factories in and outside of Ukraine, but carving and painting by hand is required because 
many of these items are small and the details of the design are minute. Factories are 
privately owned and, depending on their size, can employ up to 100 people. Items are 
produced by assembly lines of lathe operators and painters.  Painters may work on 
several batches of items at a time; while one batch’s first coat of paint is drying, painters 
begin the next batch. There are several factories in operation in Ukraine that make folk 
art items, mostly in cities in eastern Ukraine. However, factories only produce a few 
designs, probably whichever ones seem to be most popular, and the constraints of time, 
money, and materials result in lower quality products. Usually these items are made of 
cheap wood and paint, and do not display very intricate designs. Uzviz middleman 
vendors know that their items are factory produced, but to them, this does not drastically 
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detract from the tradition of an item. A pysanka made in a factory is still traditional 
Ukrainian art, but made in an easier, more modern way. Of course, it is possible that 
these vendors claim this traditional quality so that their items are more appealing to 
potential customers. An independent artist who makes pysanky would not agree that a 
factory-made pysanka is as traditional as his/her own pysanky. 
Independent artists make items in their homes or in private workshops. They are 
able to take more time and use better wood and paint, and incorporate more variable and 
diverse designs. Stylized floral patterns and fairy tale themes are common designs. The 
items also tend to be of higher quality, and therefore more expensive. These items are 
also usually signed by the artist, indicating a more personal and higher quality. In the 
Uzviz there is a leatherworker who makes purses, satchels, vests, belts, and other items. 
He buys the leather, but makes everything by hand. He comes to the Uzviz every day but 
Sunday during the summer to sell his works. Summer is the high tourist season, so this is 
when he can make the most money. In this case, leatherwork is not necessarily what most 
people would consider a traditionally Ukrainian folk art, but he is a Ukrainian artist, and 
because of this, he labels his works as traditional.  
In addition to traditional folk arts, other types of contemporary items that are 
usually not handmade, such as jewelry and scarves, are sold in the lower Uzviz. The 
jewelry does not appear to have any cultural or traditional connection to Ukraine or Kyiv; 
it is jewelry that could be found at any shop and is sold only for profit. Similarly, scarves 
sold here also might be found in stores; they are neither embroidered in the traditional 
way, nor are they souvenir scarves. That is, none of them say “Kyiv” or have pictures of 
churches or points of interest in Ukraine or the city. Though these are probably sold 
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solely for profit, they also have another use. St. Andrew’s Church is nearby and visitors 
are allowed inside. As part of church modesty custom, when women enter an Eastern 
Orthodox church they cover their hair. Not all women choose to do so, but many do, and 
if they happened to forget their scarf, they can purchase one from one of the stands in the 
lower Uzviz.  
Vendors in Andriyivsky Uzviz make the market a market. Without vendors the 
market would not exist. They are responsible for obtaining items to be sold, bringing 
them to the market, organizing and pricing them, transporting to and setting up stalls or 
stands in the market, and then manning their stations, often all day. In contrast to the sale 
of souvenirs and folk arts in the Soviet Union, where the government strictly controlled 
all sales operations, Uzviz vendors have relative autonomy. They must sell approved 
items, but there are many options within this category. As long as they are registered with 
the city and have paid the city permit fees, they are free to set up their stall or stand and 
sell whenever they choose. Summer is the high tourist season in Kyiv, and with the 
weather often pleasant, tourists may be in Andriyivsky Uzviz from 7:00 in the morning 
until 10:00 in the evening. The tourist season produces the most profit, so vendors must 
take advantage of this time; in fact, they may not sell in the market at all during winter. 
Many of them spend most of the rest of the year making inventory to be sold in the 
following summer. The non-summer seasons are also when other souvenir and arts events 
take place in Ukraine. There are regular exhibitions in various cities in Ukraine and other 
countries that artists attend to network with other artists and sell items. Some are 
recognized internationally as master artists.  (Kachur et al. 2013)  
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Vendors take great care in the ways they display their wares. Most stands or stalls 
are small and have limited space that must be taken advantage of efficiently. To ensure 
sales, having a variety of products is essential to cater to customers’ different tastes and 
preferences. Usually a stand has a table or counter on which wares are arranged, and 
sometimes there is also a wall or shelf structure behind. Smaller and less expensive items 
sit towards the front, and larger and more expensive items towards the back. It is strategic 
to place items like this because vendors know that tourists are more likely to purchase 
cheaper items; to a certain extent, items near the front will be handled the most, so it 
makes sense to place smaller and cheaper items there. This way, there is less risk of 
something large or expensive being damaged. For example, a stall where embroidery is 
sold may be a temporary structure with three walls and a small table in the front. On the 
table lie small napkins, table runners, and bookmarks. These are smaller, cheaper, and 
easier to access and handle. On the side walls hang small tablecloths and blouses. They 
are larger, more expensive, and require help from the vendor to take down. 
Vendors’ sales behavior in the market is gendered. Some vendors, usually men, 
tend to be more talkative and vocal with customers than others. I call these the salesmen. 
Men tend to stand close to their stands, closely watching potential customers and making 
conversation. Although Russian is often the language of public use in Kyiv, many 
vendors in the Uzviz speak English because of tourism. Many immediately speak English 
to tourists, probably because in their experience, tourists do not speak Russian well, or at 
all. They ask, “Can I help you find something?” or “You are looking for something 
particular?” If the customer says they are just browsing, the vendor may pick up an item 
and show how it works. For example, a vendor may take apart a matryoshka doll, to show 
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how many nested dolls are inside the largest one. He may point out the craftsmanship of 
the carving or the detail of the paint. If the customer is inspecting a Ukrainian ceramic 
whistle, which, according to folklore can keep evil spirits away, the vendor may take his 
own whistle and play a little tune on it, to show the good quality of the whistle, its tone, 
and to demonstrate how to play it. If the customer is undecided, the vendor may pick up 
another item and show that it also has the same qualities, to show consistency across his 
products. These salesmen are focused on the form of the item and its aesthetic quality. If 
the price is the issue for the customer, a male vendor may offer a discount as a bargaining 
tool. These vendors are also quick to point out if the item is a traditional folk art. They 
know that tourists often look specifically for these items because they are considered 
authentic and desirable. 
 
         Figure 12. Upper Uzviz stands with male vendors sitting nearby 
Other vendors are less vocal with customers. These tend to be women. They stand 
to the side while customers peruse their wares, and rely on the initiative of the customer 
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to ask for help in selecting or purchasing an item. Some customers may prefer this 
method because they are free to look at the souvenirs without feeling obligated to buy. Of 
course, these quieter vendors have extensive knowledge of their items, just as the more 
vocal ones do. If asked, they will share information on what the product can be used for. 
For example, they may show how to take apart a matryoshka doll, and then point out that 
children might love to have it as a toy. They may unfold an embroidered tablecloth to 
show how large of a table it would cover, and then show the customer the matching 
placemats and napkins, to be used in a full table setting in the home. Although they show 
that the products are well designed, they seem to focus on how they can be used. Women 
also offer discounts without the customer showing any interest in bargaining. If a 
customer wants to buy a painted wooden bowl, a female vendor may offer the matching 
wooden spoon at a discounted rate, because it is a set and is meant to be used together. If 
a customer wants to purchase two embroidered napkins, a female vendor may offer a 
discount for purchasing three or four.  
Ukrainianness in the Market 
Some vendors in Andriyivsky Uzviz are concerned with their image as Ukrainian 
souvenir artists. Language is a contentious topic for many Ukrainians, as I explained in 
Chapter III, and in the Uzviz it is also sometimes an issue. Vendors and artists recognize 
that tourists are often international and do not speak Russian or Ukrainian, so they often 
use English to interact with customers. Only a few words and phrases on the part of 
tourists are needed to make a purchase and for the most part, vendors do not seem to 
mind which language is used. However, tension can sometimes arise over a tourist’s use 
of Russian over Ukrainian. The extensive use of Russian in Kyiv does not agree with 
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some Ukrainians, and some vendors will assert this in the market. For example, if I 
addressed a vendor in Russian (because I do not speak Ukrainian) sometimes he or she 
answered only in Ukrainian. This, of course, might indicate that that particular vendor did 
not speak Russian well. However, this occurred several times, and with the extensive use 
of Russian in Kyiv, it seems unlikely that so many vendors’ Russian skills were lacking. 
Vendors I interviewed consistently said that some vendors prefer not to speak Russian, 
and may even refuse to do so. This can also be observed in other parts of Kyiv in similar 
types of business transactions. In this choice, vendors assert their Ukrainianness and 
linguistically claim the market as Ukrainian.  
Another way that vendors assert their ethnicity is in wearing traditional Ukrainian 
costume. Of the over 100 individual stands, perhaps a quarter of the vendors wear 
costume. Usually they do not wear full costume, but only a shirt. Traditional Ukrainian 
garb differs for men and women, but both sexes wear a similar type of embroidered shirt. 
It is usually white, but sometimes black, with red and black embroidered flower or 
geometric shapes on the chest and/or sleeve area. It has large, billowy sleeves, and a 
rounded or square collar line. Some women’s styles tend to have more embroidery than 
men’s. Compare those shown in Figures 13 and 14. While this type of traditional wear 
may seem out of place in modern times, in Kyiv and in the Uzviz it is not. It is relatively 
common to see people on the street wearing traditional costume on an average day. In the 
Uzviz, some vendors sell these shirts, so they may wear one as an extension of their 
merchandise display. Other vendors do not sell them, but wear them for other reasons. 
One vendor said she began wearing traditional costume and her sales increased by 20%. 
She said tourists began to show more interest in her stand because she was wearing a 
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traditional blouse. She thinks it gives her items authenticity, with an added economic 
bonus. To other vendors, it is important to wear a traditional outfit because they want to 
display Ukrainian culture. They are selling Ukrainian souvenirs, so they want to look the 
part. They also said it makes the market more authentic and attractive to tourists. Visitors 
feel that they are purchasing from a “real” Ukrainian, and this authenticity is transferred 
to the item itself, even though it may be factory-made.  
         
Figure 13. A women's folk shirt        Figure 14. A men's folk shirt                                                      
Photos courtesy ukrainiansite.com 
In In Search of Authenticity Regina Bendix discusses the many issues that arise 
when trying to define or quantify authenticity. She points out that past scholars have used 
authenticity “as an agent to define [folklore], differentiate it from other cultural 
manifestations, develop methods of analysis, critique competing theories, or create new 
paradigms.” (1997, 5) However, concrete definitions of it have varied, and Bendix argues 
that authenticity is nothing more than a social construct: the emotional longing for 
something essential, soulful, genuine, primitive, or transcendent. Delving deeper, it 
becomes apparent that the notion of authenticity implies the existence of the inauthentic, 
which ultimately serves to perpetuate potentially narrow ideas of cultural purity. 
Historically, notions of authenticity were associated with romantic nationalist ideals and 
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became a way for people to identify and differentiate themselves in relation to others. 
However, within the concept of authenticity lies a paradox: once something has been 
declared authentic, it is legitimized, demand for it rises, and thus it becomes 
commercialized and no longer authentic. Scholars, then, are not interested in an 
unchanging definition of authenticity, but rather in how people use and relate to the term 
and how it informs their behavior. (Bendix 1997, 3-15)  
In the case of Andriyivsky Uzviz, authenticity has varying definitions, depending 
on the type of item. For example, a pysanka would be considered authentic if an 
individual artist in Ukraine made it. It would be less authentic if it was made in a factory, 
and even less authentic if it was imported from China. Soviet memorabilia are authentic 
because they are old and represent a historically significant time period and the people 
and events associated with it. Contemporary t-shirts, for example, may be authentic 
because they come from Ukraine and have words in Ukrainian on them. Vendors make 
judgments of authenticity to decide what wares they will sell. Tourists make similar 
judgments to decide what items to purchase. Different kinds of authenticity may have 
varying levels of importance depending on the person. Thus authenticity is a subjective, 
yet essential component of market activities. 
Although I give examples above, I do not attempt to explicitly define authenticity 
in the Uzviz. In the case of folk art it seems to relate to what I have described as 
traditional in the market. Perhaps because of the setting on the historic Uzviz, and the 
cultural richness of Kyiv, vendors believe tourists come to the market expecting to see 
traditional folk arts sold by traditional-looking people who are knowledgeable about their 
culture. Here, traditional indicates rural or peasant culture, which is the origin of the 
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Ukrainian folk art items in the Uzviz. Vendors use this demand for a cultural experience 
in the Uzviz to both sell more souvenirs, and to educate visitors about Ukrainian culture.  
Gosha, an Uzviz Artist 
For one artist13 who sells his own works, the process of doing business in 
Andriyivsky Uzviz encompasses many of the concepts I have described above. Gosha 
makes lacquer boxes and pysanky and sells them in the market. He is ethnic Ukrainian; 
he was born near Kyiv but moved to Moscow as a child and lived and worked there until 
the breakup of the Soviet Union when he and his wife, Sveta, who is also Ukrainian and 
had moved to Moscow in her youth, moved to Kyiv. They were part of the Ukrainian 
diaspora living in Moscow, and yearned to move back to their homeland. Being 
Ukrainian is a defining part of Gosha’s identity: Ukrainians should live with other 
Ukrainians, he says.  
Gosha couldn’t find work in Kyiv, so he began learning to carve and paint 
miniature paintings14. He lived near an elder artist, who had been making miniatures for 
most of his life, and Gosha learned from him. While many factory-made miniatures are 
made of papier-mâché, Gosha’s mentor taught him to make them using a wood turning 
lathe. It is a much higher quality, he says.  Gosha and Sveta both learned the painting 
techniques in the Kyiv style. Miniatures are a common Ukrainian as well as Russian folk 
art. The methods for making miniatures are the same in both cultures, but paint designs 
are different. Russian miniatures are often larger and painted with scenes of Russian 
folktales, whereas in the Kyiv style, miniatures are small, detailed, and colorful flowers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For anonymity he will be called Gosha, and his wife will be called Sveta. 
 
14 This is the term he uses, but his pieces can also be categorized as lacquer boxes or painted eggs 
(pysanky). I will call them by his term.	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are the main design. Sveta is particularly skilled at painting many different types of 
flowers. She uses at least 30 colors of paint, and some of the paintbrushes she uses have 
only three hairs. In their business, she is mostly in charge of painting, while Gosha 
carves. Gosha also paints, but he prefers to paint forest scenes and traditional huts rather 
than flowers. His paint designs are not considered traditional Kyiv style, because 
miniatures in the Kyiv style are painted exclusively with floral designs. However, Gosha 
says he does not paint flowers as well as Sveta and wants her work to be the main 
attraction. He says his forest and hut scenes are a bit more masculine and do not contain 
any “women’s colors” such as pink, appealing to male customers. He likes that he can 
offer his customers options, by selling Sveta’s more traditional flower designs and his 
more contemporary designs side by side.  
Gosha’s miniatures are of much higher quality than factory produced miniatures, 
which is reflected in the intensive creation process. Gosha says it takes about three weeks 
from start to finish to produce one miniature. He and Sveta make them in batches, filling 
their workshop with tables of miniatures at various stages of production. First a miniature 
is carved from durable birch or linden tree wood that Gosha cuts from the forest. They 
must be perfectly shaped for the bottoms and lids to snugly fit together. If Gosha makes a 
mistake in the wood turning process, he begins again because painting in later stages will 
only magnify any imperfection in the shape. He also does not want to include any less-
than-perfect pieces in his Uzviz display because it would reflect poorly on his work as an 
artist. Luckily, he does not make mistakes often, since he has been making miniatures for 
almost 25 years. In addition, sometimes if he begins with the intention of carving a larger 
miniature but makes a mistake with the lathe, the wood can still be made into a smaller 
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miniature, thus avoiding wasting wood. After carving, the miniature must sit in a warm 
dry place for several days to dry out. Paint does not adhere to wet wood very well, even 
the high quality paint that Gosha and Sveta use. After drying out, the miniature is painted 
entirely with a thick coat of black paint three times and allowed to dry in between. Then 
the inside is painted red, usually two coats. The red distinguishes their miniatures from 
other Kyiv miniatures, the insides of which are usually black. Then the designs are 
painted, also in stages. In a floral design, for example, larger leaves and petals are painted 
first and allowed to dry. Then smaller petals and other details are painted in stages. It may 
take up to three or four hours to paint a single miniature that is no larger than a kiwi fruit. 
After the floral design is finished, the whole miniature must dry for a day. Then Gosha 
applies lacquer because he likes the shined and polished look it produces. He dips the 
miniature into a large container of the lacquer three times and allows it to dry between 
dippings. Then it must dry for at least a day until it is ready to be sold. Figure 15 shows 
one of Gosha’s pieces. On more cheaply made miniatures there are visible 
inconsistencies in the thickness of the lacquer on different parts. This occurs when the 
artist allows lacquer to pool inside or drip 
from an edge, usually a result of working 
quickly. Gosha and Sveta’s miniatures show 
no such inconsistencies – a mark of quality 
production.  
 
Figure 15. One of Gosha's miniatures 
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When each miniature is completely dry Gosha and Sveta do several things to 
mark them as artists. They put a small sticker on the bottoms of their pieces that says in 
English “Wood 100%”, declaring the rare quality of their miniatures. On the underside of 
a miniature lid, they write in gold paint in Ukrainian “Kyiv …”, with the year it was 
made, and put a small sticker that says in English “Ukraine”. They do not sign their 
names to the pieces, which is a bit unusual for folk artists in the Uzviz. Gosha says he 
prefers to let the pieces stand alone, without attaching his name to them because they are 
Ukrainian works of art. Without Ukraine, he says, he could not have produced these 
miniatures and so he is giving credit to his homeland and culture instead of himself. He 
also views the art of miniature making as a shared art; it is not his, but all Ukrainians’. 
For customers who are curious about him as an artist, he keeps business cards at his stand 
at the Uzviz. When Gosha speaks about the process of making his miniatures, it is 
difficult to miss the note of pride in his voice. He is modest, but he takes great care in 
making his art and labeling it as Ukrainian folk art. He seems to see himself as a 
representative of Ukraine and Ukrainian culture in the market, almost as if it were his 
duty.  
During the summer, Gosha sells his pieces every day except Sunday in 
Andriyivsky Uzviz. He owns a small apartment in Kyiv to live in during these times. The 
rest of the year he lives in a small village outside of Kyiv, where he maintains his 
workshop. He enjoys Kyiv in the summer, but the rest of the year he prefers to spend in 
the quieter, cleaner village. It is closer to nature, and to inspiration, he says. Gosha built a 
small wooden stand that he uses for display in the Uzviz. The shelves that sit on the back 
of the stand are a bit slanted from the weight of the miniatures, but it is a sturdy display. 
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He has a translucent tarp ready nearby in case of rain, but he does not need to use it much 
in the sunny Ukraine summer weather. Unlike most vendors in the Uzviz, he has 
personalized his stand. It represents a confluence of cultures, languages, and heritage. To 
show his Ukrainian pride he displays a small Ukrainian flag on one side of the stand. He 
keeps his handmade business cards (see Figure 16) in the center in a small zip top bag, 
which show his and Sveta’s status as  “Folk Masters of Ukraine. Artists of lacquered 
miniatures.” This title is state-conferred, carried over from the Brezhnev era when folk 
artists could earn this title by entering judged exhibitions. (Hilton 1995, 281-282) This is 
how Gosha earned the title15. These cards are printed in Russian. He says Russian is the 
language of his professional and business life, similar to many Ukrainians, thus he uses 
Russian on the cards. He is happy to translate them for any tourists who are interested. He 
uses the words narodnye mastera, which mean folk masters. The root of narodnye is 
narod, which carries meanings of “people, folk, nation”. It means much more than the 
stereotypical notion of folk. A 
folk artist is one that 
represents his or her people 
and who is a bearer of culture, 
to use Barre Toelken’s term. 
Gosha also uses the word 
khudozhniki, which means 
artist or painter or craftsman, and has connotations of respect and high value. It indicates 
the quality of Gosha’s work and how seriously he takes it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Other artists in the Uzviz may also have this title, but those that I spoke with neither mentioned it nor had 
business cards like Gosha’s that stated it. 
Figure 16. Gosha's business card. Identifying 
information has been blurred for anonymity 
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On the top of the stand he displays a large sign, which reads in English, “Kiev 
Miniature Paintings. Wooden ware. I am an artist, and this is my work.” (See Figure 17) 
It is atypical of Uzviz vendors to visibly declare any individual identity in the Uzviz; 
Gosha uses the first person and directly identifies himself as an individual artist. In this 
he participates in the market current trend of artist made and sold items, which may add 
to the authenticity of his wares. He uses English on his sign because many tourists do not 
speak Russian or Ukrainian. He wants the sign to be very visible to anyone who walks 
by, to differentiate himself from other vendors. Indeed, this is effective; almost all 
passersby at least slow down when walking by his stand, and many stop to look. Gosha 
speaks a bit of English and when someone stops to look at his works he immediately 
begins talking about his pieces and his artistic process. He is quick to point out several 
things: the beautiful detail of his wife’s paint work, the high quality wood, and the fact 
that he is the artist. He knows that there are relatively few artists selling their own works 
in the Uzviz, so this can be a selling point for customers. He emphasizes the quality of 
the item and how much time goes into making it. He has to be quite proactive in selling 
because his prices are higher than other vendors who sell factory-made miniatures. In 
fact, Gosha’s miniatures cost at least twice as much as factory made ones. Many potential 
customers are put off by the prices, which is why he is so diligent about the way he 
promotes himself.  
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      Figure 17. Gosha and his Uzviz stand 
However, Gosha does make a living from his art. Different sizes and shapes of 
miniatures have different costs. For example, the smallest miniature, a round box with the 
circumference of a United States silver dollar, costs 150 Ukrainian hryvnia, which is 
about 19 USD. One of the largest miniatures, about the size of a softball, costs 450 
hryvnia, which is about 55 USD. Gosha says he usually sells 10-15 miniatures a day, 
sometimes more. To give a low estimate, if he sold 10 of the smallest miniatures, he 
would make 1500 hryvnia (UAH), or about 184 USD per day. If he sells this amount for 
the four months of the tourist season (May – August), about 120 days, he would make 
180,000 UAH, or 22,500 USD. He sells the smaller pieces more often, but he says there 
are many tourists who buy his larger ones, which adds to his daily profit. Gosha also 
earns income when he sells at festivals and exhibitions during the year. He usually 
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attends two exhibitions and three festivals each year. Each of these events is around three 
days, during which time Gosha could sell up to 45 miniatures, with a combined income 
for all events around 32,000 UAH, or 4,000 USD. With selling in the Uzviz and at yearly 
events, Gosha makes around 212,000 UAH, or 26,500 USD, per year.  
According to Trading Economics’ most recent statistics, the average monthly 
wage in Ukraine in 2012 was around 3,400 UAH. (Fedec et al. 2013) Extrapolating an 
average monthly wage based on Gosha’s yearly earnings would be 17, 670 UAH, or 
2,200 USD, per month. His living is well above the average Ukrainian. The cost of living 
in Ukraine is fairly low, especially in the villages, according to Gosha, so he makes 
enough for he and his wife to live from his art. His children are adults, so he no longer 
has them to support. Gosha is very modest; he says he is grateful that his art is good 
enough to sell and that he is able to make a living as an artist. He sells in the Uzviz to 
reach the largest group of people, to show them what true Ukrainian art is and to 
represent his heritage to international audiences. 
Expressing Identity in the Uzviz 
Polese and Pregarin note in their analysis of bazaars in Odessa, Ukraine, that 
markets not only serve economic purposes, but also provide opportunities for cultural 
socialization and continuity of traditions. The informal aspect of markets allows vendors 
to profit from sales, but also to engage in cultural traditions, such as foodways, and share 
them with market goers. (2013, 110-113) Customers consider bazaars in Odessa unique, 
high quality, and genuine, especially if a vendor has some connection to her/his cultural 
heritage. The authors show that bazaars have modernized in the post-Soviet era and this 
gives them a characteristic mix of tradition and modernity, which keeps customers 
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returning. (2013, 123-125) In the same way, Andriyivsky Uzviz is a modern market 
where vendors earn profit by producing and promoting Ukrainian culture in the form of 
souvenir folk arts. Although the Uzviz’s customers are more likely to be tourists than the 
Ukrainian customers at Odessa’s bazaars, they are similar in that both groups see a 
measure of authenticity in their respective markets, which promotes their success. 
Graeme Evans describes how markets play a fundamental role in the relationship 
of souvenirs and tourism; markets may be the only contact tourists have with local 
culture, and thus the only places they buy souvenirs. This means that markets must be 
strategically located and presented authentically to attract the most tourists. Evans points 
to the commercialization and commodification of tourist art as a way that ethnic groups 
can promote their art and culture, but that this can lead to alterations of the art to match 
tourist preferences, which makes the art less valuable. (Evans 2000, 127-146) In 
Andriyivsky Uzviz, it is obvious that profit and tourist demands drive what vendors make 
and sell, but it would be remiss to discount the agency of vendors’ ethnic and national 
identities in the making and selling of souvenir folk art. Through the performances and 
wares in Andryivsky Uzviz visitors interact with Ukrainian culture. 
Bennetta Jules-Rosette argues that souvenir art has artistic value, and that market 
interactions between vendors and tourists communicate symbolic meaning on multiple 
levels. Artists’ identities in particular manifest in the art, and Jules-Rosette found in her 
fieldwork in Africa that many artists expressed in their paintings their ethnic and national 
identities, particularly those in countries with ongoing ethnic conflict. The paintings and 
their associated identities transmitted cultural information to tourists who purchased the 
paintings. (Jules-Rosette 1984, 15-29) In the Uzviz, vendors do the same. Although they 
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may not all be artists, their wares are symbols of ethnic and national identity, which is 
expressed through the vendors’ choice of what to sell, how to dress, and what language to 
speak. 
As I explain in Chapter III, folklore is often associated with nationalist thought, 
and using identity and history to distinguish Ukrainianness began in the 18th century, with 
nationalists such as Mykhailo Maksymovych who studied the folklore, language, and 
history of Ukraine in attempt to find its “national authenticity”. (Bilenky 2012, 270-279) 
Richard Dorson has written about examples around the world and points out that 
language and folklore often nurture nationalism. (1966, 277-298) This allows groups to 
intensify their identification from within, and to strengthen their differentiation from 
without. To use Benedict Anderson’s term, Ukraine’s “imagined community” employs 
nationalist ideals to further its cultural contestation with Russia, and this plays out in the 
Uzviz. Vendors engage in nationalistic behaviors in what they sell, and how they act, 
dress, and speak. They are aware of Ukraine’s history with Russia, and they use this 
awareness as well as their own Ukrainian identities to challenge the dominant Russian 
culture. It would be difficult to say that any of the vendors are explicitly political; this is 
not their primary goal, nor is it the purpose of the market. However, their wares and their 
behaviors lend themselves to a larger nationalist movement in Ukraine: the effort to 
differentiate Ukraine as separate from Russia, culturally and linguistically as well as 
geographically. 
In her study of the Ivan Kupalo crop ritual in rural post-Soviet Ukraine, Natalie 
Kononenko writes that reviving the ritual was a way for Ukrainians to affirm their 
Ukrainian identity through celebration, wearing national costume, traditional dancing, 
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and singing folksongs. Kononenko points out that nationalistic thought is not so common 
in rural areas of Ukraine, and so engaging in the ritual might be a way for people to 
connect with their pre-Soviet past, a time when their traditions were not tightly controlled 
by the Soviet regime. Ivan Kupalo has become a way for Ukrainians to reacquaint 
themselves with their traditional agrarian culture, and thus with their Ukrainianness. 
(Kononenko 2004, 196-197) Likewise, in Andriyivsky Uzviz, making and selling 
Ukrainian folk arts are ways that vendors can relate to and proclaim their Ukrainianness. 
The idea of connecting to a pre-Soviet time when Ukrainians could practice their cultural 
traditions without Russian influence, is part of why nationalism is so appealing. Folklore, 
tradition, and notions of individual “authentic” culture are all associated with national 
ideologies, and are primary reasons why they are relevant in Ukraine today.  
In his study of Hmong immigrant women in the United States making story cloths 
Dwight Conquergood illustrates that the performance of identity occurs most urgently in 
situations of erasure. When a group or culture becomes threatened in some way – 
politically, physically, or otherwise – it tries to find ways to assert and strengthen itself, 
to avoid elimination (1992, 242). While it would be an exaggeration to say that Ukrainian 
culture is on the verge of disappearing today, in recent history such a statement would not 
be so hyperbolic. Russian powers, whether in imperial Russia or the Soviet era, many 
times attempted to suppress and minimize Ukrainians and their language and culture, 
alternating with periods of allowed Ukrainization (Subtelny 2000, 210, 274,408, 421-4, 
492, 500, 516-7, 521-4). These periods created cycles of uncertainty for Ukrainians, who 
could never be sure if they would be permitted to maintain their language and cultural 
traditions or if they would be punished. Gosha expressed that he felt sad for his people, 
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Ukrainians, who have had to work hard over hundreds of years to maintain the viability 
of their traditions. He feels solidarity with Ukrainians of the past and unity with those in 
the present. In fact, he is no stranger to Ukrainian cultural suppression, as he has lived 
through later Soviet periods of Russification, and observed their effects. Russification 
may not be occurring in Ukraine today, but it is clear from the protest against the 2012 
language bill that many Ukrainians are wary of it (see Chapter III). Giving official status 
to the Russian language in Ukraine is a reminder of the past. The vendors of Andriyivsky 
Uzviz are indirectly participating in the effort against Russification by selling wares 
associated with Ukrainian cultural nationalism. 
Conquergood points out that marginalized people often use cultural performance 
to recollect and reassert their identities (1992, 243). Through cultural performances they 
can construct their public lives, which act as an arena in which identity is delineated, 
discussed, and showcased. (2006, 360) Public life for a vendor in the Uzviz involves the 
promotion of Ukrainian cultural identity. Artists and vendors can use a non-political 
space to make a political statement, through the clothes they wear, the items they sell, and 
the language they speak. Some such as Gosha, are very aware of what they are doing – 
they script their own performance, so to speak. They know how they want to represent 
themselves and Ukrainian culture, both for economic and cultural reasons.  
Deborah Kapchan has observed that markets are places where social 
performances and ethnic identity are defined within sociopolitical frameworks. In Gender 
on the Market (1996), she shows how women challenge traditional male power and 
influence in Moroccan society through their performances in the marketplace. 
Broadening this argument, we can say that one group challenges another more 
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historically powerful group through cultural performance in a market. In Andriyivsky 
Uzviz, Ukrainians challenge the dominant Russian culture. Vendors may not perform like 
Moroccan women, but they performatively promote Ukrainian culture in a way that 
supports the larger cultural nationalistic movement; they purposefully speak Ukrainian, 
sell folk arts, and wear folk costumes.  
Approaching identity in Andriyivsky Uzviz from another perspective, I also argue 
that although the market expresses Ukrainian identity, that identity contains within it 
compromises and contradictions. Consider the example of Gosha. He identifies strongly 
as Ukrainian, and symbolizes this in his art. However, his business card is printed in 
Russian because it is the language of his business life, as it is for many Ukrainians. His 
lacquer box miniatures are based on a Russian folk art tradition that he has brought into 
the Ukrainian space by painting in the Kyiv style. Gosha makes compromises in his 
Ukrainianness so that he can run a successful business. However, this also shows that 
Ukrainianness is not always dependent on language, at least for Gosha.  
The overlap of Russianness and Ukrainianness appears in the market’s wares and 
vendors. Both Ukrainian and Russian souvenirs are sold. As I explain in Chapter III, 
approximately 17% of Ukrainian citizens are ethnic Russians, so it is likely that some 
vendors are Russian. Vendors have to make compromises in selling to tourists. Many 
tourists take scheduled, guided trips to Kyiv, and may not know anything of its unique 
history or culture. Some may expect to seen Russian souvenirs, and some may only be 
looking for something “authentic”. To make a sale, some vendors allow tourists to think 
that they have bought something authentically Russian, or authentically Ukrainian, even 
if the item is not. Rather than explaining to tourists what it means to be Ukrainian, 
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vendors may simply smile agreeably, and use the opportunity to make a profit. Thus, 
promotion of Ukrainianness does not always singularly drive market activities. This 
shows that the binary of Russian and Ukrainian is in some ways artificial.  
Vendors emphasize Ukrainian culture while at the same time Russia stands as the 
unstated “other”. Ukrainianness seems always placed in opposition to Russianness. The 
imperial context I discuss in Chapter II is therefore still in play in the market, and in 
Ukrainian nationalism as a whole. Ukrainians in the market resist the dominant Russian 
culture, and in doing so, acknowledge its existence. Sherry Ortner remarks that the binary 
of resistance and domination highlights the play of power between two groups; one 
cannot exist without the other. Resistance relations among groups and enforces their 
respective identities. (Ortner 1995, 175) Without the Russian foil, Ukrainian nationalism 
(in the Uzviz, Ukrainian political life, or elsewhere) would not be as potent.  
Considering the history of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia we can see that 
Andriyivsky Uzviz is a place of political performance. The lack of explicit political 
statements is indicative of the acceptable parameters for behavior at the market; the 
market space is more like a festival than a political stage, although politics do manifest 
there. A festival is multigeneric, spatially bound, and defined by the presence of a large 
group of people, with food, drink, and celebration. Symbols, rather than words, 
communicate messages and values. It is a safe place where people can express their 
identities and question others’. (Schechner 1993, 46) The importance that some Uzviz 
vendors and artists place on making and selling only authentic Ukrainian souvenirs and 
self-identifying as Ukrainian is the way they communicate their identities in the non-
threatening market space. They are part of the larger nationalistic sentiment. In my 
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concluding remarks I will explore what this might mean for people in the Uzviz, Kyiv, 
and even Ukraine as a whole. Richard Schechner even points out that festivals can result 
in great political change. (1993, 47) The goal is not necessarily complete independence 
from Russia, because, indeed, Ukraine economically relies on Russia for many things, 
such as gas. What is important is cultural independence; that is, that Ukrainian culture be 
recognized as independent from and on equal footing with Russian culture.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the last three chapters I have explored and analyzed the history of folk arts in 
the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations and 
Ukrainian nationalist thought, and, to show how these histories have come together in 
present day Ukraine, profiled Andriyivsky Uzviz souvenir market in Kyiv. In the market 
we can see the legacy of Ukrainian folk arts in the contents of vendors’ stalls. A state 
government body no longer controls the market, and vendors have more autonomy in 
choosing what they sell compared to the way folk arts were regulated by the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union. Many vendors sell contemporary souvenirs such as t-shirts 
and coffee mugs, some sell Soviet memorabilia items, and others sell only Ukrainian folk 
art wares. Some of these include pysanky, embroidered folk costume, and wood carved 
bowls and spoons. I focus on these folk art items to show the aspects of continuity and 
dynamism in folk art production in Ukraine. Vendors successfully entered the tourist 
market, and in Andriyivsky Uzviz, they have tailored their business to cater to tourist 
demand and preferences. The continuing presence of folk art wares in the market 
(handmade, mass-produced, or imported) shows that they are still an important part of 
Kyivans’ economic and cultural lives. 
In Chapter III I complicated the topic of folk art in Ukraine by discussing the 
history of Ukraine’s relations with Russia. The two countries share a long, intertwined 
history that makes today’s Andriyivsky Uzviz more than just a souvenir market. The rise 
of Ukrainian nationalism began in the 18th century; the ideology that sprang from 
Herder’s romantic nationalism continues to manifest today. Ethnic Ukrainians and 
	  	  107 
Russians have many similarities: histories, languages, folklore, and cultures. They also 
rely on each other economically. Yet, many Ukrainians would like to see increased 
separation from Russia. Ukrainians have politically, socially, and linguistically 
challenged Russian hegemony in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Language in Ukraine is particularly sensitive, as the language of public life has been 
Russian for decades, but many Ukrainians would like to see more Ukrainian usage in 
public. The Orange Revolution of 2004 and the 2012 language bill protests showed the 
ability of thousands of Ukrainians to unite against what they considered to be over 
reaching of Russian influence. Such protests continue to bolster nationalist Ukrainians’ 
determination to break away from Russian dominance. Most recently, in November 2013 
Ukrainians protested in the streets against President Yanukovych’s decision not to seek a 
bid for Ukraine’s admission to the European Union. Many consider this move to have 
been in response to Russian threats to freeze gas trade with Ukraine if it tried to align 
more with the west.  
The nationalism that permeates these political events also flows through the street 
of Andriyivsky Uzviz. Not all vendors are ethnic Ukrainians or sell Ukrainian folk arts, 
but those who do make a statement about Ukrainian identity and culture. They are not 
explicitly political, but they use the relative harmlessness of a souvenir market to express 
their Ukrainianness. Many wear traditional folk costume, speak Ukrainian rather than 
Russian, and sell Ukrainian folk art items like embroidery and pysanky. Artists such as 
Gosha assert their Ukrainianness, by mounting small flags or listing prices in Ukrainian. 
Gosha does not consider himself political, but he has strong opinions about his 
Ukrainianness, and he is open about declaring it. He feels a responsibility to make his art 
	  	  108 
so that visitors to Andriyivsky Uzviz see what Ukrainian folk art and culture is. His 
performance of identity is an important component of his market activities, and he also 
enjoys a well-made living from his art.  
In order to reap the economic benefits of market activities, vendors must 
sometimes make compromises in their Ukrainianness. For example, Gosha often uses 
Russian and English while conducting business. He also has taken a Russian folk art form 
and made it Ukrainian by painting his miniatures in the Kyiv style. The binary of 
Ukrainian and Russian is, then, sometimes artificial. Yet, one contrasts with the other; the 
struggle of Ukrainian nationalism in the market depends on the existence of the Russian 
“other”.  
My research in the Uzviz has omitted many other complexities of the market, 
which offer future opportunities for research. In this thesis I focus primarily on vendors 
and folk art souvenirs, but I do not analyze tourists and how they interact with vendors. In 
future research I would like to spend time at the market listening to conversations 
between vendors and customers to understand their motivations; I can imagine that they 
haggle prices, ask questions, or discuss the history of an item. This information would 
provide insight on how Uzviz customers choose items to buy, and how vendors verbally 
represent their wares. It might also indicate ethnic or national identities of tourists.  
I have also omitted explorations of ethnic groups other than Russian and 
Ukrainian. As I briefly discuss in Chapter III, Ukraine contains many minority ethnic 
groups such as Belorussians, Romanians, Moldavians, Poles, Tatars, Jews, and Roma, 
among others. The national census in 2001 only reports those groups that make up at least 
0.1% of the total population of Ukraine. Ethnic groups vary in different parts of Ukraine. 
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They are generally accepted into the larger population and, since the 2012 language bill, 
their languages are recognized in Ukraine as regional languages. I am interested in if and 
how any of these groups present in Andriyivsky Uzviz. Diversity may affect vendor 
relations in the market and would complicate my conclusions about its Ukrainianness. I 
have focused on Ukrainians’ struggle against Russian culture, but minority ethnic groups 
may be engaged in similar struggles against the dominant Ukrainian culture and thus 
create many other binaries that I have not touched on. This would add a deeper dimension 
to my research and enrich my argument. Another topic I omit is music in the Uzviz. I 
observed many different types of musicians playing in the square and I believe future 
research would show a fair amount of ethnic diversity in performers. This would also 
allow me to analyze how the music may add to visitors’ market experiences and may 
express divergent forms of Ukrainianness.  
I have written about Ukrainian nationalism from the perspective of the Uzviz, and 
related it to the current political climate; however, future research might also point me to 
ways that nationalists outside of the Uzviz use Ukrainian folk art and folklore in general 
as part of their group identity and activities. I have noticed a few instances of this such 
Kyivan protesters against the 2012 language bill dressed in traditional folk costume, and 
imprisoned politician Yulia Tymoshenko always wearing her hair in a traditional 
Ukrainian folk style, but I am sure there are more.  
Ukraine offers a plentiful and multi-faceted set of research questions. I have 
discussed and analyzed only a small part of nationalism, identity, and Ukrainianness that 
is found in Andriyivsky Uzviz. Politics and economics in Ukraine have proven to be 
dynamic and unpredictable in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and recent 
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events indicate that this will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. 
Highlighting this changeability, the market exhibits both continuity and dynamism in folk 
art and artists. On the one hand, artists like Gosha reference the past and ensure the 
continuation of arts. On the other hand, I have illustrated the changes of folk art over the 
last 150 years, how the roles of artists and vendors have changed, and the recent physical 
renovations to the market space. Future research on the market’s diversity will surely 
reveal even more processes of change.  
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APPENDIX 
TYPES OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN FOLK ART IN  
IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
 
• Architecture – (Ukr. arkhitektura, Rus. arkhitektura) varied depending on region.  
Examples:  
khata – Ukrainian peasant dwelling 
izba – Russian peasant dwelling  
carved panels for display outside and inside of the building 
 
• Clothing* – (Ukr. odyah, Rus. odezhda) peasant shirts, skirts, dresses, scarves, etc.  
 
• Embroidery* – (Ukr. vyshyvka, Rus. vyshivka) more common in Ukraine, usually 
clothing such as shirts, skirts, hats; or household items such as tablecloths, napkins. 
   Common Ukrainian examples:  
    rushnyk – embroidered towel 
    vyshyvanka – embroidered shirt 
 
• Furniture – (Ukr. mebli, Rus. mebel’) chairs, tables, etc. usually made of birch wood. 
 
• Icons – (Ukr. ikona, Rus. ikona) religious paintings on wood, usually with gold 
accents. 
 
• Lace-making – (Ukr. kruzhevopletenye, Rus. kruzhevopleteniye) 
 
• Lubok – Russian (Ukr. lubok) a popular print depicting images from literature, 
folktales, or religious stories, pl. Ukr. and Rus. lubki 
 
• Painting* – on canvas, on lubki, and on wood carved items 
 
• Pottery* – (Ukr. keramika, Rus. keramika) 
 
• Pysanka*– Ukrainian (pl. pysanky), (Rus. pisanka, pl. pysanki) painted egg, 
historically made of real egg shell, now carved from wood 
 
• Wood carved items* – Russian and Ukrainian, usually birch or linden wood  
Examples:  
matryoshka – Russian nesting doll, pl. matryoshki (Ukr. matr’oshka, pl. matr’oshky) 
bowl – (Ukr. chashy, Rus. chashi) 
spoon – (Ukr. lozhky, Rus. lozhki) 
    lacquer box – (Ukr. shkatulka, Rus. shkatulka) small wood boxes of various shapes, 
painted with fairy tale scenes (Rus.) or floral patterns (Kyiv style), usually on a 
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black paint base, then covered with transparent lacquer; also can be made of papier 
mache 
    toys – (Ukr. ihrashky, Rus. igrushki), small figurines of human or animal shapes, some 
have mechanisms that allow movement 
 
 
Author’s Note  
 
This list represents some of the most common folk art types in Imperial Russia 
and the Soviet Union. They are first listed in English, with Ukrainian and Russian 
translations/transliterations. Items marked with * indicate those that were found in 
Andriyivsky Uzviz souvenir market in Kyiv at the time of my research.  
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